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ABSTRACT 
 Ghana is a relatively new producer of oil and gas in the sub-Saharan African region. 
Commercial oil and gas production and their expansion have the potential to enhance 
economic and social development. However, the enclosure of the Gulf of Guinea for oil 
and gas commodification has led to conflicts over ocean space once used for small-scale 
food fisheries. Fishing has been banned within a 500m radius of all offshore oil rigs and 
other infrastructure while the bright lights of the oil rigs attract fish into the ‘no-go’ zones 
creating a network of de facto Marine Protected Areas (MPA). Fishing around the oil rigs 
is illegal leading to conflicts and growing resistance from small-scale fishers. The 
literature argues that where conflict has occurred in states endowed with natural resources 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the resource curse theory gives the best explanation for why 
conflicts around natural resources occur. The conflict between small-scale fisheries and 
the oil and gas industry in Ghana, is considered an example of the resource curse. The 
thesis reveals resource curse tendencies such as corruption and the mismanagement of oil 
rents and growing inequality and poverty. However, the resource curse argument has 
been critiqued as uncritical, reductionist and above all ahistorical. The study therefore 
suggests that as an alternative way to understand the conflict, analysis must move beyond 
the resource curse narratives to the historical geography of resource grabs tied to the 
creation of enclaves and commodity frontiers. The study uses the changing toponymy of 
maps of the region, analyzes texts, and images to understand how ocean space in the 
Western region of Ghana is understood, represented and transformed over time by 
different resource actors. It concludes that despite the heavily commodified resource 
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extraction along the Western region’s coast since the fifteenth century, oil and gas 
exploitation is the first commodity frontier to directly appropriate ocean space from 
fisheries. This has resulted in the enclosure and depletion of a nationally important food 
source. The oil and gas exploitation has therefore resulted in a decline in food security 
and sovereignty in a country that has a very high per capita fish consumption rate.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 Introduction 
The existing and latent resources of the sea are many and varied; their rational 
development and utilization offer a technical, economic and social challenge. 
(Schaffer and Revelle, 1959;17 quoted in Hurberty and Flock, 1959) 
 
 
        In 2007, Kosmos Energy Oil Company of America, listed on the New York stock 
exchange (NYSE) under KOS arrived trying to find oil in the Ghanaian Gulf of Guinea 
off the historic Cape Three Points1. After several failed attempts by Ghana to find oil in 
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) during British rule and again after independence by 
the Canadian company Petro Canada, Kosmos struck oil where others had come up dry. 
Kosmos and its investment partners came away with a projected US$2.2 billion, leaving 
filmmaker Racheal Boynton (director of Big Men) to claim in 2014 that oil makes men 
thieves.   
The aptly named Jubilee field discovered by Kosmos has led to oil dreams in 
Ghana—a country noted for good governance in a region otherwise dominated by civil 
war, violent conflict and blood tied to oil2. The Jubilee oil field and its storage vessels 
(FPSO figure 1.1) are icons representing what oil can do for the nation. The Jubilee 
typonymy for the ocean floor at 00 latitude and 00 longitude is a common feature of 
                                                
1	Cape Three points is the southernmost tip of Ghana, the land nearest to the sea which marks the 
western end of the Gulf of Guinea. Historically, there has been an abundance of lighthouses in the 
area, constructed by the British beginning in 1875. The light houses served as navigational aids for 
trading vessels sailing through the Gulf of Guinea.  
2 In places such as the Niger delta region, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, oil and 
mineral extraction has resulted in conflicts and violence. In the Niger delta, for example, oil spills and 
gas flaring have destroyed fisheries and farm lands (see Ukiwo, 2008).   
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discussion in the media and is represented on coastal maps of Ghana. The oil finds have 
triggered hope for additional revenue to support an ailing economy (Gary, 2009). It is 
anticipated that GDP and revenue from the oil will provide jobs, sustain growth and 
enhance infrastructure development (Gary, 2009). 
 
 
         Figure 1.1 Jubilee field and FPSO Kwame Nkrumah 
         Source; http://platformlondon.org/2012/06/28/tullow-oils-foul-play-in-ghana/  
 
 
           However, the ocean space and fishing grounds in the western region (Figure 1.2) 
have captured the attention of the local media, non-governmental organizations and 
researchers for other reasons: the conflicts in the use of ocean space between oil and gas 
and small-scale fisheries. Simply stated, the oil and gas activities have appropriated 
fishing places. Historically, the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) has been dominated by fishers 
who operate on a small scale at a subsistence level using relatively small boats. The 
fisheries are described by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) as small-scale 
	3	
or artisanal fisheries based on their use of local technology. Their livelihood is threatened 
by oil and gas development. In assessing the impact after one year of oil and gas 
exploration in 2011, TV3 evening news, a local station, pointed to the negative impacts 
of the ongoing oil and gas production on fishing, food and the livelihood of coastal 
dwellers. A 2011 headline ‘Fish versus Oil’ led to public interest in exploring how oil and 
gas production activities have encroached on small-scale fishing in the offshore zones. 
The local news also explicitly noted the reduction in the fish catch, with coastal dwellers 
and small-scale fishers struggling over access to dwindling catch3 because of oil and gas 
exploitation activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 TV3 news, 2012. Report on the impact of the oil and gas production on fishing activities and 
livelihood. See  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oI_9Wvo9b5E  
	4	
 
Figure 1.2 Map of the Western region                          Adapted from Agblorti, (2011) 
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           The conflict between oil and fish persists, with those opposed to the development 
pointing to the extent of the oil and gas activities offshore. Along the western Gulf of 
Guinea coast, oil and gas activities take place very close to the coastline, just 60 miles 
away from the shore on inshore traditional fishing grounds (Agyei et al., 2012). This is 
different from the extent of oil and gas activities in other places around the world such as 
Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom, where oil exploration and exploitation 
activities take place well offshore, even beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 
There is another problem as well. The International Association for Standardization (ISO) 
rules for offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation requires oil companies to use 
lighting systems for security and do not permit any activity within 500 meters of oil rigs 
and other infrastructure; these become no go zones (Grant 1978; Arbo and Thuy, 2016). 
But small-scale fishers in western Ghana often complain that the strong lighting systems 
on the floating production storage and offloading vessels (FPSO) function as Fish 
Aggregating Devices (FADs), attracting most of the fish within the 500-meter exclusion 
zones (Bagley, 2011). The areas around the oil and gas infrastructure have become de-
facto private property enacted through the ISO requirements associated with offshore oil 
and gas installations and infrastructure.  
The future of marine fisheries and the food they provide to Ghanaians is 
uncertain, given the considerable investment in oil and gas resource extraction in the 
Western Gulf of Guinea region, the appropriation of the fishing commons and the threats 
to food security, sovereignty and the livelihoods of fishery workers (Adusah Karikari, 
2015; Agyei et al., 2012; Boohene & Peprah, 2010).  
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 The GOG is a major source of food and the cheapest source of animal protein for 
people living in West African countries (Attah-Mills et al., 2004; Marquette et al., 2002). 
Global estimates of seafood consumption by coastal indigenous communities (Figure 1.3) 
show the Gulf of Guinea littoral as the highest fish consumption zone in the world, with 
an average of 164kg of fish consumed per person per year compared with the global 
average of 19kg per year (Cisneros-Montemayor et al., 2016). In Ghana, fish contributes 
roughly 60 percent of the protein in local diets (Boohene and Peprah, 2010). In other 
words, the sea is heavily relied on to feed the population.  
About 86 percent of fishing in Ghana is done in the Gulf of Guinea, not in fresh 
water (GSS, 2012b). Small-scale, artisanal or vernacular4 fishing and processing are key 
sectors in the coastal communities of Cape Three Points, Axim, Akwidae, Elembele, 
Jomoro and Shama where some fishers use wooden canoes with paddles and others use 
small outboard motors. With the livelihood and sources of food threatened and oil and 
gas jobs limited, there is resistance to the enclosure of ocean space for oil and gas 
production. Scholars point to deleterious social, economic and cultural consequences for 
Ghanaian fishing communities, saying the conflict requires attention (Ackah Baidoo, 
2013; Adusah-Karikari, 2015; Boohene & Peprah, 2010).    
 
 
 
                                                
4 Vernacular has been used to describe local and traditional fishing practices of men and women based 
on limited capital, unmanaged labour and mainly non-mechanized technology (see Pope, 2004; 
Johnson and Bakakki in Murton et al., 2016). 
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Figure 1.3; Global estimates of fish consumption by coastal indigenous peoples. 
Adapted from Cisneros-Montemayor et al., (2016) 
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          Critical studies in sub-Saharan Africa have employed the resource curse thesis5 
(see Freynas in Cumming et al., 2017) to explain conflicts and other negative impacts of 
natural resource exploitation. The resource curse approach emphasizes good 
management, proper governance and the restitution of quality institutions to ensure the 
benefits from oil and gas exploitation trickle down to entire resource-rich nations, 
particularly adjacent communities (Cumming et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2006). In 
resource-endowed states with poor governance, civil wars, weak institutions and weak 
civil society groups, the entire state does not benefit from the resource windfall 
(Cumming et al., 2017). However, as Ferguson (2006) points out, sub-Saharan African 
states with poor governance, civil wars, and weak institutions have not suffered a 
withdraw of foreign direct investment, quite the opposite.  Failed states can continue to 
attract foreign investment and development funds from transnational corporations who 
accumulate resource rents and extremely high profits through the creation of resource 
extraction enclaves defended by strong private security forces.  This is especially the 
case, Ferguson (2006) argues, when oil and gas resources are located offshore. 
           The resource curse thesis ignores this ongoing history of enclave development, 
assuming the need for good governance to attract foreign investment when examples such 
as Angola and Nigeria prove otherwise (Obi, 2009,). While there is yet to be empirical 
research on the resource curse in the Western region of Ghana specifically, examples 
from sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that the resource curse theory fails to explain how 
                                                
5	 In this study, I use resource curse theory and resource curse thesis interchangeably as in the 
literature. I use the term resource curse to denote scholars’ explanation of problems of resource-rich 
nations; the theory has not been proved, however.  
	9	
profits can be extracted without good governance, indeed, Ferguson (2006) argues that 
ongoing conflicts and lack of good governance and rule of law can provide lucrative 
business opportunities.  When the resource curse is taken as something that needs to be 
proven, as opposed to a taken for granted assumption, understandings of resource conflict 
changes. When examined from the historical perspective of different periods of colonial 
resource enclosure, exploitation and appropriation; resource grabbing; and ‘enclave6’ 
resource development, understanding of the conflict between fisheries and oil 
development in the Western region of Ghana is transformed from that of resource curse 
explanations. 
Ghana’s colonial contacts began in the 15th century when the Portuguese arrived 
at the Gulf of Guinea coast after being granted a Papal Bull by Pope Nicholas V to 
explore the African Coast (TRC, 2015; Wolf, 1982). Maritime explorers had discovered 
the wealth of the African coast and European monarchs were interested in gaining access. 
When the Portuguese moved into the Gulf of Guinea, the colonial and imperial 
domination of the indigenous people by Europeans began. The Portuguese appropriated 
and exported commodities, including slaves, ivory and gold, to Europe. European 
exploration and colonization established what I refer to as a toponymy of appropriation 
that renamed the littorals of West African states according to the resources available to 
                                                
6 Ferguson (2006) describes enclaves as a development model where local communities and 
economies adjacent extractable resources are alienated from the employment and trade opportunities 
associated with resource development that benefit multinational corporations and their shareholders 
over the citizens of resource rich states. Under the enclave development model, capital investment in 
does not flow into local regions but is captured by multinational extractive firms provided with 
contractual legal authority to exploit resources by the state, with ongoing access to resources 
guaranteed by the military and private security firms. 
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appropriate and exploit: the slave coast, gold coast, ivory coast and most recently the oil 
and gas coast.  
Toponymy, or the study of place names, can uncover vital historical information 
about a place, including the spatial-temporal distribution of economic activities. It can 
also provide insight into the social conditions and life of people from a particular location 
(Cloke et al., 2005). The toponymies of the western Gulf of Guinea region indicate a 
commodity trade in slaves, gold, ivory and now oil.  
          Commodity trade in the region began with the Portuguese, British, Danes and 
Dutch heavily involved in gold until the gold stocks were depleted; at that point, attention 
shifted to the slave trade. Before the Europeans became involved in the slave trade, 
slavery was a common feature of the indigenous Ghanaian coastal empires (Agbodeka, 
1992). Many people were captured and enslaved as labourers, head porters and servants 
in powerful kingdoms such as the Ashanti. Some slaves were sent to the coast and sold to 
the European merchants who transported them through the Atlantic Ocean to Europe or 
the Caribbean (Agbodeka, 1992). However, unlike the chattel slavery7 practiced by the 
European empires, the slaves in the Ghanaian kingdoms had a chance to be freed and rise 
through the hierarchy to be masters after years of servitude. The chattel slave trade along 
the coast continued until the 19th century, when it was abolished. 
         The European empires built forts along the coast as enclaves to protect 
development, trade monopolies and the transportation of commodities to Europe. Out of 
                                                
7	Chattel slavery is used to denote the earliest form of slavery where slaves were property that could 
be bought or traded or inherited. 
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the 15 forts in present day Ghana, seven were established in the western region, reflecting 
the importance of the littoral for European trade (TNCP, 2012). Fort St. Anthony in Axim 
in the Western region is the second largest and oldest European fort constructed in the 
region; it was intended to protect and facilitate the gold and later the slave trade between 
interior forest dwellers and Europeans (TNCP, 2012). The establishment of the forts 
attests to the fierce competition between the European empires in resource appropriation 
along the coast (Decorse, 1992). 
          Despite the long resource history of the region, the various uses of ocean space and 
the central role of colonial empires, this history plays no role in resource curse 
explanations of conflict. Many scholars (Ayelazuno, 2014, Obi, 2009, 2010) question the 
resource curse model and its effectiveness in understanding and addressing problems of 
resource exploitation and conflicts. Ignoring history to emphasize a theoretical resource 
curse, turns the resource curse thesis into a universal law to explain the conflicts and 
resource problems of sub Saharan Africa. In the resource curse literature, ignoring 
historical antecedents narrows explanations and precludes understanding of the 
complexities of conflicts and violence (Le Billion in Perreault et al., 2015). Explaining 
resource conflicts from the perspective of historical geography opens up numerous 
options; conflicts can be examined in the context of a wider variety of actors and 
processes (Le Billion in Perreault et al. 2015). Le Billion in Perreault et al. (2015) says 
such an approach eliminates reductionist analyses and recognizes the situated nature of 
conflicts.   
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          This thesis employs a historical geographical approach to understand the conflict 
between small-scale fisheries8 and the oil and gas industry in Ghana. The study begins 
with an examination of the resource curse thesis. It further suggests that, explanations and 
analyzes must move beyond the resource curse thesis to examine the historical geography 
of resource grabs tied to enclaves and the history of commodity frontiers in order to 
understand the conflict. 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS; 
The study is guided by two overarching objectives.  
1. To understand the historical geography and complexity of the conflict between 
the oil and gas industry and fishing activities in Ghana and how this conflict is 
understood in the scholarly literature on the resource curse. 
2. To examine how the Ghanaian coast and the larger Gulf of Guinea have 
historically been understood as a resource frontier as an alternative way of 
understanding present day conflicts between oil and fish, food security and 
sovereignty in the western region of Ghana (Furlong and Norman, 2015). 
My specific research questions are the following: 
1. How has the conflict between the oil and gas industry and the small-scale 
fisheries been framed by the resource curse literature?  
                                                
8	The thesis uses small-scale fisheries to reflect FAO definitions of small scale or artisanal fisheries. 
Small-scale fisheries are traditional fisheries involving households as opposed to commercial entities; 
they use relatively small amounts of capital, use small fishing vessels (e.g. canoes) and aim more for 
subsistence than commercialization. The prefix ‘artisanal’ or ‘subsistence’ is applied based on the 
level of technology practiced. See  http://www.fao.org/faoterm/collection/fisheries/en/  
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2. How has the Gulf of Guinea been mapped, represented and valued as a resource 
grab frontier from the time of European contact up to the present? 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY, THEORY AND RESEARCH PROCESS 
This section explains the methodological approach, theoretical framework, and the 
method of data collection. It is divided into three parts. I begin by explaining the 
methodological approach and theoretical framework. I then discuss the method of data 
collection and analysis.  
Research Methodological Approach 
           Qualitative research is based on interpretivism (Walsham, 1993). It sees human 
actors such as researchers as constructors of knowledge who use in-depth interpretations 
to depict reality. Such analysis is dependent on the researcher's knowledge, creativity, 
and understanding of the problems of the research setting (Bhattacherjee, 2012). I 
adopted a qualitative historical geography methodology to explore and interpret the use 
of the Gulf of Guinea coast and its connections with colonial forces and agents, 
postcolonial state and non-state actors and the capitalist world system. I did so to shed 
light on the contemporary appropriation of the ocean by the oil and gas industry and the 
ensuing conflicts with small scale fisheries in Ghana.  
             There is a long tradition of studies on resource extraction in West Africa and 
along the Gulf of Guinea, but little importance has been placed on using an historical 
approach to study the social, cultural and economic conflicts associated with 
contemporary resource exploitation. The existing historical resource studies have focused 
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on the commodity trade between the 16th and the 19th century. Historians Boahen (1992), 
Rodney (1969), and Agbodeka (1992) have all explored and discussed the slave and gold 
trade in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa. They note the colonial influence in 
establishing and transforming the West African littoral into a space for commodity 
exploitation. A more recent study by Bridge and Fredriksen (2012) uses a historical 
research methodology to show how space comes to be transformed by resource 
extraction. Drawing on colonial government and other archives, they show that European 
colonialism turned a geographic space in the periphery into a globally-connected 
extractive-economy network.  
Why is an historical research approach useful for this study? Simply stated, 
knowledge of the past is valuable in dealing with contemporary problems. Historical 
research offers the opportunity to go beyond the superficial to deal with the complex 
nature of events and to understand historical precedents for present conflicts (Ary & 
Razavieh, 1996; Johnson & Christensen, 2000). I did not take the contemporary social 
world at face value; rather, I challenged myself to go beyond the common understanding 
of social phenomena (in this case, the conflict between regional fishers and international 
extractive corporations) to ask questions about what generates conflicts in the region and 
where the historical roots of this conflict are located (Tewsksbury, 2009).  
My questions required archival exploration and the analysis and interpretation of 
documents, ideas and maps to find the patterns in the historical resource geographies of 
the Gulf of Guinea and, thus, to understand the present conflict between fish and oil 
historically. I paid particular attention to 1) literature and reports analyzing and 
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discussing natural resource conflicts and the risk factors identified. I also investigated 2) 
historical use, representation and the transformation of the Gulf of Guinea coast through 
commodity exploitation and trade and its connection to colonialism and capitalism. I paid 
attention to maps, images, and pictures of the Gulf of Guinea left behind by colonial 
administrations as many of these help with understanding the contemporary Gulf of 
Guinea, its uses and users. By historically exploring the conflict, I was able to examine 
the elements of power relations and politics at work throughout historical resource 
appropriation and expansion in this region.  
                                                       Theoretical Framework 
       The thesis explains the conflict between the oil and gas industry and small-scale 
fisheries by linking the literature on the resource curse to resource grabs, commodity 
frontiers and toponymy. It examines the resource curse theory in Chapter 2 and offers 
alternative explanations of the conflict using historical geography in Chapter 3. The 
toponymy of maps is a useful tool to understand what previous users of the region/place 
had in mind and what locations were valued (Harley, 1989; Kadmon, 2004; Meyer, 
1994). Maps are the means empires use to know, explore and calculate places of resource 
wealth and commodification (Harley, 1989; Moore, 2017b). The historical toponymy of 
the maps of the Gulf of Guinea depicts a series of resources: gold coast, slave coast, ivory 
coast, and oil and gas coast. This series of resources illuminates the present-day conflict 
by describing the ongoing commodity frontiers of resource appropriation. These maps 
represent the interests of European colonizers, not necessarily the importance of a 
location for those living there.   
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           An abundance of resources is generally considered a blessing as it can promote 
economic growth and development. However, research shows that the abundance of 
resources can be more of a curse than a blessing, especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mikesell 1997; Ross 1999, 2001; Sach &Warner 1995). Sachs and Warner’s (1995) 
cross country comparative study on resource endowed states finds a strong relationship 
between natural resource abundance and negative economic growth. Similarly, 
Mikesell’s (1997) analysis shows a slower rate of growth among resource endowed 
developing countries. Among twenty-three mineral exporting resource endowed nations 
analyzed, - 0.5 percent and - 0.9 percent in the annual per capita growth was observed for 
all but five of the countries studied (Mikesell, 1997).  
          Humphrey et al. (2007) say that in the late 1970s and 1980s, oil and gas resource 
endowed states saw a lower rate of growth than countries lacking those resources. This 
claim is supported by Gary (2009) who contends that between 1970 and 1993, nations 
without oil saw 400 percent more growth than countries with oil. He concludes that the 
abundance of a resource can be a barrier to economic development. Brass (2008) and 
Ukiwo (2008) indicate that an abundance of resources (oil) creates inequality, poverty 
and poor standards of living in resource rich nations under capitalist conditions. This 
results from weak institutions and mismanagement of revenue from resources and the 
internal and global class dynamics of capitalism (Ross, 2015). For example, despite the 
oil resource abundance of Nigeria and Chad, Indigenous communities adjacent to the oil 
fields are impoverished (Brass 2008; Ukiwo, 2008)  
          Furthermore, evidence shows that the abundance of resources in resource rich 
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nations leads to authoritarianism, political instability, corruption, and conflicts (Ross, 
2015). Schubert (2007) asserts that political instability, corruption, and conflict creep into 
an economy when resource rich nations have undiversified economies. Governments pay 
attention only to windfalls generated from oil to carry out their activities while resource 
communities themselves are marginalized and neglected (Schubert 2007; Ukiwo,2008;). 
Pritchard (2014) further contends that revenue from oil becomes the sole focus of 
governments, seeking to stabilize authoritarian rule and power by controlling resources. 
Revenue from resources controlled by the government (oil and diamonds) can be used to 
finance violent conflicts to strengthen political position and incumbency (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Le Billion 2001;). Similarly, where main government interests lie in 
winning elections, governments marginalize resource communities and make little 
investment in public needs in favour of personal enrichment (Le Billion, 2001). 
          Kabia (2008) and Ukiwo (2008) emphasize that poverty and marginalization of 
resource communities triggers conflicts because of corrupt practices and mismanagement 
of resource revenues. In their study on Sierra Leone’s diamond, and Nigeria’s oil 
resources, they demonstrate that resource communities are marginalized and neglected in 
the share of the windfall from abundant oil and diamond resources. The amount of 
revenue allocated to resource communities was less than 10 percent of the total value. 
Ukiwo (2008) demonstrates that indigenous people’s farm lands and fishing grounds in 
Nigeria were destroyed by oil spills and drilling activities; this resulted in armed rebellion 
and militant resistance.  
        Despite the impressive evidence amassed by researchers to justify the resource curse 
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theory, the debate on the abundance of natural resources as the cause of conflicts and 
other economic problems such as poverty is widely challenged. Recent studies and 
reviews by researchers posit that resource abundance alone does not explain resource 
problems and conflicts (Ross, 2015; Obi, 2010). In his study of the resource curse in 
developed and less developed resource-rich nations, Maloney (2002) found that 
abundance is not the sole cause of the resource curse. Botswana, Chile, Australia, 
Norway, Malaysia and Indonesia and Canada developed in spite of their resource wealth. 
Also, Ferguson (2006), demonstrates that despite the numerous problems such as civil 
wars, conflicts and political instabilities that tend to plague resource rich nations in sub-
Saharan Africa, many direct foreign investors continue to invest in these nations unlike 
states with good governance and national development plans. This is because the states 
operate with an enclave development model. However, while ‘enclaves’ serve the 
profitability of corporations they cannot be described as successful models for citizens   
as they breed resentment, resistance, demands for local employment and can also 
maintain and produce violence and conflict in resource communities. All of these 
negative effects are ignored by resource curse explanations (Ferguson, 2006).  
As noted above, the resource curse theory ignores the history of resource-rich 
nations and the problem of enclave development in favour of a narrow focus on the 
abundance or scarcity of resources (Obi 2009, Ayelazuno, 2014). To gain a better 
understanding of violence in Nigeria, Watts (2004) moves beyond the resource curse 
thesis and the essential link between oil and violence to examine how historically 
produced enclaves of ‘governable’ and ‘ungovernable’ spaces are produced in an ‘oil 
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complex’, with each having a different form of conflict or violence attached to it.  
        In a recent paper on resource geography by Furlong and Norman (2015), it is argued 
that resource abundance and scarcity narratives applied by scholars from the resource 
curse theoretical position, fail to adequately explain resource violence and conflicts. 
Ongoing global resource grabs such as land, ocean, and water appropriation and 
enclosure by powerful forces, including state, non–state, and transnational actors, results 
in violence as resources are taken by force (Furlong & Norman, 2015). Furlong and 
Norman (2015) suggest that analysis of resource violence should move from resource 
curse to resource grab explanations.  
Studies show that resource grabs result from power struggles between conflicting 
users who desire to control and use natural resources (Tietengberg & Lewis, 2000). The 
literature suggests that land grabbing (Hall 2013; Borras et al., 2012) and ocean grabbing 
(Bennett et al, 2015; Franco et al. 2014; Knott & Neis, 2016) are problematic but there is 
no clear consensus on what constitutes a resource grab (Borras et al., 2012). Resource 
grabbing has been considered to encompass the acquisition of natural resources by states, 
non-state investors, and actors who prioritize development plans and financial investment 
in natural resources over adjacent populations and their livelihoods (Norman & Furlong, 
2015; Rulli et al. 2013). Furlong and Norman (2015) reiterate that resource grabs through 
the financial investment of state and non–state actors produce violence through enclosure 
and exclusion, mostly affecting communities adjacent to sites of resource extraction, 
including oceanic resources. 
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In recent discussions of fisheries, ocean grabbing has been used to describe a wide 
variety of conservation and fisheries management practices that affect communities 
adjacent to the coast (Knott & Neis, 2015). Bennett et al. (2015; 63) say: ‘Ocean grabbing 
is the dispossession or appropriation of use, control or access to the ocean space or 
resources from prior users, rights holders or inhabitants.’ Bennett et al.’s (2015) study 
shows that space and resources can be appropriated through legitimate or illegitimate 
means in the form of enclosures. For example, Foley, Mather, and Neis (2015) describe 
the implementation of the Exclusive Economic zones (EEZ) as part of the law of the sea 
as a form of ocean enclosure and property making. It has encouraged nations to extend 
their areas of sovereignty to manage, and exploit their oceanic resources. Evidence 
suggests that ocean grabbing takes places through policies, laws, and practices such as 
access agreements that reallocate ocean use from small-scale fisheries, fishing 
communities, and individuals to state and corporate actors without considering the 
negative implications or equity concerns for local resource users (UNO, 2012).  
             The literature further suggests that ocean space and its resources, such as fish 
species and hydrocarbons, are appropriated and controlled by powerful hegemonic forces 
and economic actors who decide on use, conservation, and management (Bennett et al., 
2015; Franco et al., 2014). The analysis of ocean grabbing sheds light on how local 
communities and individuals whose lives, cultural identity and livelihood depends on 
small-scale fisheries, are affected by resource development (Franco et al., 2014). National 
governments, for example, may implement fisheries policies and reforms to enhance 
economic development and foreign exchange, but these may forcefully evict 
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marginalized groups and indigenous coastal communities, resulting in resistance (Bennett 
et al., 2015). 
          Exacerbating the issue, financial investment in fisheries by corporate actors re-
allocates fisheries and ocean space into the international market (Bennett et al., 2015; 
Franco et al., 2014). These powerful forces only focus on maximizing profit from the use 
of the ocean and cause harm to small-scale fisheries. Franco et al. (2014) contend that 
profit maximization through privatization converts the ocean commons or public space 
into legally protected property, and this negatively affects the cultural identity and 
livelihood of indigenous fishing communities. These practices commodify ocean space 
and limit access to the ocean by local fishers. The ocean grabbing literature has been 
extensively applied to fisheries and aquaculture development plans and reforms that 
appropriate and reallocate the fishing spaces and resources of indigenous communities 
(Franco et al., 2014; Knott & Neis, 2016). Consequently, it is applicable to the capitalist 
appropriation of the fishing livelihood of indigenous coastal communities along the Gulf 
of Guinea littoral since the 15th century. 
Commodity frontiers are formed when ocean space is enclosed and resources are 
grabbed and appropriated as private property. Moore describes commodity frontiers in 
two ways: (1) ‘a zone beyond which further expansion is possible,’ and (2) a ‘kind of 
space with forward movement of [the] capitalist system’ emphasizing advancing 
commodification (Moore 2000, p.  412). Moore says the expansion of capitalist relations 
is possible only as long as space and labor are still available to be enclosed and 
appropriated (Patel & Moore, 2017). Beinart and Hughes (2007) describe commodity 
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frontiers as historical European settlements where resources are exploited in overseas 
territories; the transition of the resource into the commodity leads to the creation of a new 
frontier. They stress that commodity frontiers refer to historical European trade, 
settlement and productive enterprises that focus on exploiting resources in overseas 
territories, transitioning them into commodity forms that enable the creation of new 
frontiers allowing for continuous economic growth. The expansion of commodity 
frontiers (in this study the coast/sea for oil and gas extraction) is possible as long as there 
is un-commodified space, labor, and land available for conversion (Moore, 2000, 2015, 
2017a; Beinart and Hughes, 2007). 
A recent study by Moore (2017a) argues capitalism is a feature of early 
commodity frontiers motivated by colonial forces and empires. According to Moore 
(2000), commodification is expanded when colonial forces go beyond the current 
resource frontiers of a geographic space to other fields. Furthermore, frontier 
development pushes capitalist expansion to other fields whenever its productivity is 
exhausted, allowing new land/sea to be occupied and new labor to be appropriated and 
exploited. Moore’s historical materialist approach posits commodity frontiers as zones of 
appropriation and dispossession of nature, women and colonial labor, destabilizing 
existing frontiers by creating new ones (Moore, 2015). In the Gulf of Guinea for 
example, cycles of commodity frontiers evolved when land, slaves and gold were 
appropriated by Europeans who arrived on the coast in the 15th century. This 
appropriation and exploitation shapes commodity frontiers and capitalism, leading to the 
exhaustion of resources and human labor (Moore, 2010, 2015, 2017a). Moore’s (2000) 
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study of a sugar plantation in Madeira shows that whenever there is a frontier expansion, 
domestic labor is marginalized, while labor with expertise is brought into protected 
enclaves to work in the industry—a problem in Ghana’s oil industry today9.  
According to Moore (2017b), the expansion of capitalist production is aided by 
the tendency for frontiers to extend their zones of exploitation, appropriation and 
accumulation of the unpaid work ‘cheap nature’ provides. This makes exploitation and 
appropriation of natures (and human natures) the central feature in commodity frontiers 
(Moore, 2000). Commodity frontiers are driven by the desire to cut costs and increase 
land and labor productivity by appropriating the surplus of the world’s ecology (Moore 
2017a). Economic power is exercised in commodity frontiers and states use violence and 
knowledge to appropriate nature at a low cost (Patel & Moore, 2017).  
Moore’s ideas on the commodity frontier, Ferguson’s description of resource 
enclaves, and the resource curse theory (Ayelazuno, 2014, Obi 2009, 2010; Sach & 
Warner, 1995) as well as resource and ocean grabbing theory (Bennett et al, 2015; Franco 
et al, 2014; Knott & Neis, 2015), help to illuminate the historical resource uses of the 
Gulf of Guinea coast and relations with colonialism/colonial forces, modern state and 
non-state actors, capital, and conflicts. Chapter 3 uses these key theories and concepts to 
explore the historical representation and appropriation of resources of the western Gulf of 
                                                
9	As an example, I met a woman at church a few days after I arrived in St John’s. She wanted to know 
where I came from and why I was there. After a brief conversation, she told me her son worked on 
offshore oil rigs in western Ghana. This illustrates Moore’s (2000) assertion that when frontiers are 
established, foreign labor and expertise are imported to enhance productivity and commodity frontiers; 
this marginalizes indigenous people and local labor.  This also illustrates Ferguson’s (2006) argument 
about resource enclaves. 
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Guinea of Ghana to shed light on the role of historical capitalism and colonial power 
relations in the present conflict between the oil and gas industry and the small-scale 
fisheries; it argues that this is better understood as a case of resource grabbing not a 
resource curse.  
Methods of Data Collection 
         I began my study in the spring of 2016. I explored the literature on fisheries in 
western Ghana, their contribution to food security and sovereignty, fishery practices, 
cultural, and gender roles and the extent of fishing and how it is managed in local 
communities and nationally. I paid particular attention to historical developments up to 
the present, the problems the sector faces and the evolution of fishing practices. This gave 
me a good sense of the importance of the sector to the local people, community, and 
nation. I was then able to conceptualize the impact the oil and gas exploitation activities 
are having on livelihoods and fish availability and to understand the competition for the 
use of the ocean. Similarly, exploring the history gave me a fair understanding of 
situations when conflicts have occurred in fisheries and instances when fishing activities 
have been negatively impacted because of the different uses of coastal resources.  
I also attended the 2016 Petro Cultures conference at Memorial University. A 
presentation on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gave 
me an in-depth understanding of laws covering the uses of the ocean and how they might 
apply to the case of small scale fisheries in Ghana. I got a sense of the demarcation of the 
oceans and how human activities are regulated and operationalized in the sea. This helped 
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me re-imagine and interpret fishing and oil and gas operations on the coast, as well as the 
degree of power over ocean space that these two activities command.  
           My research methods included document analysis which began in spring 2016. I 
assembled the archival data using the search engines Google Scholar, World Cat, Scopus 
and Web of Science. To broadly understand the discursive issues surrounding the conflict 
and the dominant way these conflicts are framed by resource scholars, I analyzed the 
Ghanaian case using the resource curse theory (discussed in Chapter 2). I undertook a 
critical review of the resource curse literature, selecting all papers exploring the resource 
curse theory. The evaluation criterion was the keyword ‘resource curse theory’. As I 
retrieved over 2000 documents, I scaled down the list using key variables ‘Africa’ ‘oil 
and gas’ and ‘conflicts’. This allowed me to identify trends in the resource curse 
explanation and see how the trend continued to evolve and change after the emergence of 
oil and gas development activities on the African continent and in the Gulf of Guinea.  
          In addition, I reviewed the archives and policy documents of the Government of 
Ghana, media, and non-governmental organizations’ reports. Using the keywords ‘small-
scale fisheries and oil and gas,’ ‘oil and gas’ ‘oil and gas in Ghana’ and ‘oil and gas 
reports Ghana,’ I retrieved all documents covering Ghana’s oil and gas activities. I paid 
attention to reports by the government, Ghana statistical service (GSS) living standard 
survey documents, the 2015 budget statement of Ghana, FAO 2016 reports on Ghana’s 
fisheries, and Ghana’s extractive industry (GHETI) reports on oil and gas exploitation. I 
explored the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC), the Ghana Integrity 
Initiative (GII) report, and reports from non-governmental organizations, IMANIs 
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(Ghana statements and reports on oil and gas, its revenue management and corruption). 
As the conflict is not documented in government policy reports, I explored media reports, 
news articles, and media interviews to learn the views of the fishers, aggrieved 
community members and key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry on the fish-oil 
conflicts. I critically evaluated Big Men, a 2014 documentary on oil and gas discovery 
and procurement processes in Ghana and Nigeria by American film producer Racheal 
Boynton. Taken together, these helped explain resource curse tendencies in the Western 
region of Ghana and in Ghana as a whole. The resource curse review and explanation 
served as the baseline to make a case for a different understanding of the conflict beyond 
the resource curse.  
       To broadly understand the conflict (see Chapter 3), I assembled colonial government 
documents, historical maps, pictures, writings and narrations on the Gulf of Guinea coast 
on internet websites and world cat using the keywords ‘Gulf of Guinea’, ‘oil and gas Gulf 
of Guinea’ and ‘Gulf of Guinea, Ghana oil.’ I paid attention to excerpts of speeches of 
former Presidents on oil and gas, as well as video and audio documents on Ghana’s oil 
and gas industry. The pictures and maps adapted from journals and digital sources 
provided a helpful source of information, grounding the thesis in the geographical setting 
and informing my interpretation. The coast and the western region of Ghana are studied 
by historians, fishery scientists, and anthropologists. Agbodeka (1992) extensively 
describes the economic history of Ghana; Nunoo et al. (2014) discuss the history and 
reconstruction of marine fishing along the coast from the 1950s to 2010; Rodney (1969) 
studies the gold and slave trade; Nunkunya (1989) examines maritime fishing among the 
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Ewes along the coast of Ghana. The earlier work done on the Gulf of Guinea littoral built 
a foundation explaining the evolving toponymy, capitalist resource development and 
appropriation and enclosures in the region. 
             Finally, the thesis seeks to understand how oil and gas activities impact food 
security and sovereignty as these are grounded in vernacular fishery practices in Ghana. I 
use the traditional Ghanaian cuisine, fish sauce (shito) to explain the cultural significance 
of fish as food and illustrate the impact of the oil and gas exploitation on the fish sauce 
tradition by relating to my own family’s traditional fish food ritual and personal 
observations from within the country. To gain insights into the topic, I discussed the 
importance of fish in Ghanaian diets with my grandmother who has rich experience in the 
preparation of fish sauce. My grandmother, though not from a fishing community, has 
been involved in the preparation of fish and fish sauce for years; she knows the patterns 
and changing trends in fish availability along with many Ghanaian women who are the 
main preparers of fish for eating in the country. Through her, I gained a richer personal 
understanding of what is at stake when fisheries are enclosed by oil and gas operations in 
fishery dependent nations like Ghana. 
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Analysis 
After assembling and scanning primary documents, I analyzed secondary sources 
and maps, speeches from the media, audio and video data using qualitative content 
analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Elo & Kyngas, 2008; Mayring, 2014). The initial 
document scan of the resource curse literature and the government, and non-
governmental organizations’ documents on oil and gas development revealed key words 
such as corruption, poverty, weak institutions, authoritarianism and conflicts; these are 
problems commonly associated with resource-rich nations classified as resource cursed. I 
critiqued the resource curse theory and interpreted and analyzed the historical sources 
using ‘deductive content analysis’ to understand the conflict.     
   Deductive content analysis is employed when a study is built on knowledge 
from previous research findings and methodology (Elo &Kyngas, 2008). Such an 
approach offers the researcher an opportunity to derive a holistic understanding of a 
social phenomenon through inferences from documents, text and data (Elo &Kyngas, 
2008). The texts on maps of the Gulf of Guinea over time show a linked series of 
toponymies: gold coast, ivory coast, slavery coast, and oil and gas coast. I used these as 
keys to the diverse and changing uses of Gulf of Guinea resources. I then incorporated 
keywords (slavery coast, gold coast, oil and gas coast) into my theoretical framework to 
offer an historical explanation of the conflict, examining how the diverse historical 
coastal resource uses have shaped the present conflict between oil and fish.  
  
	29	
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized around two papers, with an introduction and conclusion. 
The former explains the reason for the research and describes the research process, while 
the latter draws connections between the papers and reflects on their findings and 
significance. The two main manuscript papers are written for peer-reviewed publications 
but have not yet been submitted.  
Following this introductory chapter, the first paper, Chapter 2, examines the 
conflicts between fish and oil in Ghana as these are framed by the resource curse 
explanation. The second paper, Chapter 3, explains the conflict through an historical 
geography of resources of the western region of Ghana and the Gulf of Guinea through 
the lens of historical geography of resource grabbing and enclaves. It draws on maps of 
the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) and histories of the GOG to contextualize and situate current 
conflicts between oil and fish into an ongoing series of conflicts around resource grabs, 
appropriations, enclosures, and exploitation of labor in the region. Using the shifting 
toponymy of maps, the paper examines previous uses of the Gulf of Guinea ocean space 
and vernacular fishing practices to explain the conflict between the oil and gas industry 
and artisanal fishing activity. Chapter 4, the final chapter, summarizes the two research 
papers and examines the impact of the conflict in terms of vernacular food security and 
sovereignty. It makes a case for the significance of the study and suggests how the 
conflict could further be explained and studied in the future. 
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1.4 CO-AUTHORSHIP STATEMENT  
      This thesis has been completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Geography at Memorial University. This research was funded 
by the ‘Too Big to Ignore’ global partnership for small scale fisheries. The student 
designed the research proposal with feedback from his supervisor Dr. Dean Bavington. 
All chapters are solely authored. The student did the document scan, explored the 
archives, collected the map sources and other data used for the analysis. The student 
analyzed the primary and secondary data and drafted the manuscript while the supervisor 
provided feedback on the framing of the thesis, edited the write-up, suggested and 
assisted in assembling the literature. The supervisor and committee member also 
suggested the writing style in their role as members of the supervisory committee.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’  
Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Gulf of Guinea, Ghana  
 
Abstract 
 
 On June 5, 2010, Ghana celebrated its first commercial oil production from its large 
Jubilee field. The discovery and subsequent commercial drilling of the Jubilee field was 
hailed as a significant step toward increasing the country’s GDP and accelerating 
economic growth and development. However, the commercialization of oil and gas and 
the attendant development came at a cost, which included the closure of part of the 
western Gulf of Guinea of Ghana to other ocean activities. Specifically, the establishment 
of no-go buffer zones around oil infrastructures offshore led to conflicts over the use of 
ocean space and the exclusion of small-scale fishers from former fishing grounds. From a 
theoretical perspective, the now-famous resource curse theory would explain this conflict 
between fishing and oil activities in Ghana as an inevitable outcome of natural resource 
development. The resource curse thesis posits that natural resource extraction and 
commodification inevitably lead to conflict in the absence of ‘good governance’. This 
paper counters such an explanation and argues that applying the resource curse thesis in 
this context is deterministic, reductionist, uncritical of power relations and ahistorical. 
The paper critically examines the resource curse theoretical position and the way it 
frames conflicts between small-scale fisheries and oil and gas development, using the 
Gulf of Guinea as an example. It explores the resource curse literature and identifies key 
arguments surrounding the connection between corruption, conflicts, authoritarianism, 
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and weak institutions and resource wealth in sub-Saharan Africa. The resource curse 
theory and its application is contrasted with alternative approaches to the conflict 
between small-scale fisheries and the oil and gas industry in Ghana.  
Keywords: Resource curse, conflict, oil and gas, fishing, resources, enclaves 
 
Introduction 
        Among sub-Saharan African countries, Ghana is one of the highest-ranked in 
democracy, transparency and good governance indexes. These indices include the 
existence of an independent judiciary, checks and balances, and opportunities for public 
participation from stakeholders (Walter, 2004). However, despite scoring high on 
democracy, transparency and good governance, Ghana is suffering from an ailing 
economy. Ghana is dependent on primary resource exports whose prices have been in 
decline including major export commodities such as gold and cocoa. In the midst of this 
economic downturn, mining and oil extraction are considered the only means for 
converting the nation’s endowed mineral resources into social amenities and facilitating 
much needed economic development (Davis & Tilton, 2005). Unsurprisingly, previous 
governments have encouraged the capitalist development of the country through oil and 
gas commercialization, with a particular focus on the Jubilee field (Gary, 2009), which is 
located relatively close to the shore in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Ghana.  
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           Oil exploitation began in the Jubilee field 10 on December 15, 2010 (Agyei et al., 
2012), but exploration activities began in 1896 in the onshore Tano Basin (Figure 2.1) in 
the western region of Ghana (Boateng, 2008). The Jubilee field is in the Gulf of Guinea 
off Cape Three Points (Akyinkyin11) in water roughly 1100 m deep and 60 km offshore. 
The total oil reserve is estimated to be over 370 million barrels, with the potential to 
expand to 1.8 billion (Agyei et al., 2012). This oil reserve has been lauded for the 
economic contribution it will make to the nation’s GDP and infrastructural development. 
As one former President of Ghana declared, ‘Oil is money and money is used to provide 
social amenities and infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, clinics and roads’ (Gary, 
2009). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that oil would contribute US 
$20 billion in foreign revenue to the government over a production period between 2012-
2030 (Gary, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10  Jubilee field is the name of this oil field as the oil discovery coincided with the Golden Jubilee 
anniversary of Ghana gaining independence from Great Britain. 
11  Local name for Cape Three Points. 
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Figure 2.1: Map showing the western region, Ghana and the offshore Jubilee oil 
exploitation site in the Gulf of Guinea (Adapted from Tullow Oil, 2010). 
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       However, the abundance of natural resources in sub-Saharan African countries has 
made minimal contributions to development goals, despite the economic projections and 
development promises. In many cases, resource communities living adjacent to oil and 
gas exploitation sites are neglected and marginalized; they remain impoverished and see a 
decline in their lifespans and quality of life (Kabia, 2008; Ukiwo, 2008). Benefits from 
oil exploitation accrue to only the key stakeholders and actors in resource economies, 
particularly oil and gas-endowed nations, who monopolize resource rents and profits. 
These include traditional government leaders, government ministers in charge of energy, 
and corporate leaders of oil companies. For example, in Donald Trump’s cabinet, these 
would include secretary of state Rex Tillerson, the former CEO of Exxon Mobil. 
According to the documentary film, Big Men (2014),  greed allows an elite few to benefit 
while the majority lose out. The film examines corruption and how it unfolds among oil-
rich nations of the Gulf of Guinea, particularly Ghana and Nigeria. American film 
producer Rachel Boynton documents the greed and self-maximizing attitude of key 
stakeholders in petroleum upstream processes.  
            In addition to the ‘Big Men’ syndrome that plagues oil and gas exploitation, the 
activities of oil platforms have led to the enclosure of part of the ocean, making it 
inaccessible to small-scale fisheries (SSF) along the western Gulf of Guinea coast of 
Ghana. ‘No-go’ zones have been implemented to protect oil rigs and other infrastructure 
in accordance with international safety regulations. Fishers are banned from fishing 
within a 500-meter radius of the oil rigs and within 2 km of other infrastructure such as 
pipelines and transshipment terminals (Arbo & Thuy, 2016). The situation for fishers is 
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worsened by the fact that the bright lights of the oil rigs attract fish to the oil rigs, leaving 
the fishers with little option other than to ignore the law and venture close to the rigs in 
search of fish. Small-scale fishery workers resist the imposition of no-go areas, creating 
conflicts with oil extraction companies and the Ghanaian Navy who patrol and enforce 
the no-go zones. There have been reports of clashes between the navy and small-scale 
fishers at night when fishers follow the fish into no-go zones (Gary, 2009).  
          Some scholars attribute conflicts over resources such as fisheries, forests, water 
and land to their scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Myers, 1993; Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). 
For example, Homer-Dixon (1994) stresses that environmental scarcity is the determining 
factor in conflicts over resource development. Typical narratives explain resource 
conflicts as stemming from the increasing pressure human populations put on renewable 
resources, coupled with biophysical environmental changes and degradation (Myers, 
1993; Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). Violent conflicts occur wherever natural resources are 
scarce and there is competition for their use or exploitation (Le Billion, 2001a). 
          However, Dietz and Engels (2014) argue against scarcity as the main factor in 
resource conflicts. Conflicts are not just caused by scarcities, they say, but economic 
factors, or more specifically, inequalities between those with the political power to 
control resource rents and the public they represent (Dietz & Engels, 2014). Escobar 
(2006) asserts that environmental scarcities and neo-Malthusian assumptions alone 
cannot explain conflicts over resources. For others, it is not the scarcity of resources that 
drives conflict but the abundance of undiversified resources in resource-rich nations (De 
Soysa, 2002; Le Billion, 2001b).  
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Moving beyond the binary perspective of either scarcity or abundance, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) argue that conflict is driven by the greed inherent in human nature, 
especially when people have opportunities to gain personally from resource rents at the 
expense of the general public12. The looting of resource rents and corrupt leaders give 
rise to rebellions; different factions fight to control revenue and one set of ‘Big Men’ is 
often replaced by another. As Le Billion (2001a) stresses, political authorities may even 
ensure that conflicts occur around resources; conflict is functional in that it provides 
cover for them to accumulate personal wealth from resource rents.  
The civil wars, conflicts, resistance, and deprivation that have persisted in 
resource-rich nations including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
Angola, are often explained under the rubric of ‘the resource curse.’ This paper situates 
the conflict between the oil and gas industries and the small-scale fisheries (SSF) in the 
western region of Ghana in this context. It begins by assessing some of the key tenets in 
the resource curse thesis and their applicability to natural resources such as oil. It 
critiques the major resource curse explanations, arguing that the theory does not 
adequately explain the conflicts between the oil and gas industry and SSF in the 
Ghanaian context. The paper suggests that an alternative explanation of the conflict 
moves beyond the resource curse thesis to focus on the historical geography of resource 
grabs tied to colonial and neocolonial extractive enclaves and commodity frontiers. In 
                                                
12	Rachel Boynton’s (2014) documentary film on ‘Big Men’ focuses on the greedy nature of key 
stakeholders who desire to benefit at the expense of the public in petro-capitalism among oil and gas 
nations, particularly Ghana and Nigeria. (see Big Men documentary 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsjubN_4H3E	
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conclusion, the paper highlights some key resource curse examples from sub-Saharan 
Africa and summarizes how the curse is used to explain conflicts between oil companies 
and fisheries in Ghana. 
The Resource Curse Thesis 
          The concept of the resource curse, also referred to as the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 
1997), is widely used in the social sciences to explain conflict and development 
abnormalities associated with resource-endowed states. The theory suggests that the 
development or abundance of natural resources is detrimental to the growth of national 
economies (Auty, 1993; Humphrey et al., 2007; Sach & Warner, 1995). This counter-
intuitive observation applies to resource economies or those countries that generate at 
least 8 percent of their GDP and 40 percent of their foreign exchange earnings from the 
extractive sector (Auty, 1993;3). The resource curse theory explains why countries 
endowed with natural resources tend to perform poorly in economic development and 
democratic governance compared to countries that are less resource-rich (Auty, 1993; 
Sach & Warner 1995). The literature on the resource curse theory posits that resource 
endowment and abundance have negative effects on governance. Resources, the theory 
assumes, automatically breed corruption, violent conflict and the looting of state assets 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Humprey et al., 2007; Le Billion, 2001a). Scholars say the 
abundance of undiversified resources leads to poor economic growth and poverty (Auty, 
1993; Humphrey et al. 2001; Sach and Warner, 2007). A growing body of literature is 
attempting to explain this paradox (see Stevens, 2003; Ross, 2015). 
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       Stevens (2003) traces the critical analysis of resource abundance and its associated 
economic impacts on nations to the fourteenth century and the early writings of the 
Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun. Since the fourteenth century, Stevens (2003) contends, 
development economists have paid attention to the potential negative effects of natural 
resources on the development of resource-rich nations. However, modern interpretations 
of the resource curse emerged in the post-Second World War period. According to 
Hirschman (1958), secondary and tertiary processed resources found primarily in 
industrialized countries have a greater ability to enhance economic growth than primary 
exports alone. Examining the trade relations between primary and secondary exporters of 
natural resources, Presbisch (1964) concludes that exporters of primary commodities lag 
behind industrialized nations in spite of the abundance of their resources because of the 
poor terms of trade for primary commodity exports. The favorable terms of trade written 
by the highly industrialized countries lead to stronger economic growth in resource-poor 
but highly developed economies than in countries that are primary resource exporters. 
However, it is hard to determine the truth of these claims, as today’s statistics complicate 
the evidence (Stevens, 2003). For example, some primary exporters of natural resources 
have developed, while some industrialized countries suffer from trade agreements 
deemed deleterious to their economic growth. 
          In the 1970s, many resource-rich countries were attracted by increases in oil prices. 
The rising price of oil brought on by OPEC led to high borrowing by oil-endowed states 
who used their oil reserves as collateral. However, a sudden, drastic fall in prices in the 
early 1980s resulted in a debt crisis for most, including Nigeria, Mexico, and Venezuela 
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(Humphreys et al., 2007). Mabro and Manroe (1974) say that during this period, critics 
realized oil and mineral exports had the potential to undermine the economic 
development of oil-rich nations. At the same time, the power to develop natural resources 
was placed in the hands of newly independent governments and post-colonial leaders in 
Africa, Asia and South America (Humphery et al., 2007). Most of these newly 
independent governments and their leaders abused their power and used resource 
revenues accumulated through national agencies for personal gain. 
          Scholars of the resource curse emphasize the importance of macroeconomic effects 
such as the ‘Dutch disease’, in which the competitiveness of other sectors of resource-
endowed nations is reduced due to currency appreciation resulting from resource wealth 
(Humphrey et al., 2007). The Dutch disease gained prominence in resource curse 
explanations in the 1980s by generalizing what happened in the Netherlands in 1959. The 
Dutch export of large quantities of natural gas caused the rapid appreciation of the Dutch 
currency (guilder) which negatively impacted the ability of Dutch manufacturers to 
competitively export their goods or even to employ workers to build them, leading to an 
overall decline in national economic performance (see Gylfason, 2001; Humphrey et al., 
2007).  
       In the 1990s, resource curse analysis focused on the political economy of oil and 
mineral resources in resource-rich nations (Doraisami, 2015). Most resource-rich nations 
during this period failed to implement policies that would be beneficial to their growth by 
counteracting economic problems such as the Dutch disease. At the time, scholarly work 
by economists focused on how resource-rich nations could dramatically enhance their 
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growth and development if policies were implemented to counteract the macroeconomic 
effects of resource wealth (Stevens, 2003). Richard Auty first used the term ‘resource 
curse’ in 1993 to apply to issues of failed or poor economic growth in resource-rich 
countries.  
       Collier and Hoeffler’s 2004 study drew attention to the impact of natural resource 
endowment on economic growth and development by focusing on human nature and 
institutional design to explain the success or failure to capitalize on resource wealth. 
Their research focused on sub-Saharan Africa and other developing resource-endowed 
regions around the world; they suggested that windfalls from the export of primary 
resources increased the onset of conflicts by motivating armed rebels to use violence to 
gain access to resource revenues, pointing to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
as an exemplar.  
The resource curse theory continues to develop and provoke scholarly interest, but 
since the 2000s, resource curse explanations have met with increased scrutiny and 
criticism. Table 2.1 summarizes the key moments in the development of the resource 
curse literature and the shifting explanations and policy recommendations from the 1950s 
to the 2000s. 
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      Table 2.1. Development of resource curse theory 
Year   Key 
Resources  
      Impact of Resource curse     Key 
Authors 
1950-1960 
 
Agriculture 
Timber 
Gold 
  
Low contribution of primary exports. 
Resource curse explanation focused on 
assessing the poor economic growth in 
developing resource rich nations due to 
the poor terms of trade for resources 
exported in their primary state.  
Hirschman 
(1958)  
 
 Presbisch 
(1964) 
 
1970-1980 
 
Oil  
Gold 
Diamond 
Dutch Disease was the resource curse’s 
key impact. Resource curse narratives 
examined macro-economic policies to 
counteract Dutch diseases and strengthen 
national currency evaluation. 
Mabro & 
Manroe 
(1974), 
  
Humphrey et 
al., (2007). 
 
1990 
 
Gold 
Diamond 
Oil and gas 
The period is marked by low GDP 
contribution and poor economic growth 
in resource endowed states. Resource 
curse explanations have assessed 
political economy of oil and minerals 
and their contribution to resource 
endowed states. 
Sach & 
Werner (1995, 
1997),  
 
Auty, (1993). 
 
2000 
 
Oil and gas 
 
 
Rents from resources have been linked 
to political failure such as; corruption, 
Poor institutional quality and 
Mismanagement of resource rents and 
conflicts. 
Resource curse studies have been based 
on claims of human and institutional 
failure in the governing of resources.  
Collier & 
Hoeffel 
(2004), 
 
Salaa-i-Martin 
& 
Subramaniam 
(2003). 
 
Authors’ construct, 2017 
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         Ongoing interest in the resource curse thesis has been attributed to the vast natural 
resource endowments in the developing world, particularly in the sub-Saharan African 
region and the continent’s failed post-independence economic ambitions. Special mention 
is often made of Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Chad and the Gulf of 
Guinea region as classic cases of the resource curse tied to oil and gas development 
(Brass, 2008; Le Billion, 2001a; Obi, 2010b). Some areas of sub-Saharan Africa 
represent new commodity frontiers, as oil and gas resources are being discovered in large 
quantities by traditionally oil-less nations, including Niger and Ghana. As Stevens (2003) 
explains, the economic windfall from newly developed oil and gas fields in these 
countries has the potential to be an economic and political problem rather than a magical 
solution. Academia, government, and non-governmental organizations such as the World 
Bank and IMF have sought to ensure that resources do not become a curse for these new 
oil frontier states. The World Bank and IMF focus has been on providing support and 
capacity building for good governance and institutional reform rather than on examining 
historical context or proposing radical alternatives to the socio-economic and political 
status quo. 
                         Criticism of the Resource Curse and Alternative Explanations  
 
             The resource curse theory has been challenged by scholars from diverse 
academic disciplines (Table 2.2). Researchers in the fields of Economics (Bougrine 2006; 
Mikesell, 1997), Geography (Le Billion, 2001a, 2001b; Watts, 2004,), Political Science 
(Robinson, et al., 2006; Ross, 2001), and Development Studies (Ayelazuno, 2014; 
Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Obi, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, Basedu & Lay, 2009, Ferguson, 2005) 
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have all argued against the theory’s assumptions and analyses. Critics of the resource 
curse seem to agree on the tendency of the abundance of resources in resource-rich 
nations to translate into positive economic growth and development, but they disagree on 
the underlying reasons why some achieve this and others do not.  
              Critics argue that nations with an abundance of resources have a high probability 
of seeing economic growth if good institutions exist, with proper records of production 
and transparent accountability for all revenue generated from oil and gas development 
(Bougrine, 2008; Robinson et al, 2006; Wistrom, 2013). With good institutions in place, 
resources can become economically useful to resource-rich states. Yet in reality, most 
resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa have poor institutions, issues of 
mismanagement and corrupt practices. Other researchers say abundant resources have a 
tendency to cause conflicts since they must pass through several elite channels before 
benefiting ordinary citizens (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Sachs and Warner,1995)   
           However, Ross (2015) asserts that there is not enough evidence of a causal link 
between natural resource abundance and authoritarianism, corruption, and civil conflict to 
warrant arguments in favor of the resource curse. The resource curse depends on several 
factors; abundance is only one and it is relatively unimportant (Basedau, 2005; Ross, 
2015). Maloney (2002) asks why ‘abundance’ is so central in assessing the relevance of 
resources in resource-rich nations. If resource abundance is a curse, why are some 
resource-rich countries such as Botswana, Chile, Australia, Norway, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia so well developed? (see also Darkwa, 2010; Wright & Cuesta 2004).  
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           Resources are socially constructed and controlled by agents and actors in global 
oil capitalism (Le Billion, 2001a). This echoes Zimmerman’s assertion that ‘resources are 
not, they become’ (Zimmerman, 1957, cited in Peach and Constantin 1972). However, 
resource curse analysis ignores the role of global capitalism and how resources are 
socially constructed. Obi (2010a) stresses that the abundance of resources is not a curse, 
but resources are ‘cursed’ by the emphasis placed on them by powerful actors and 
transnational corporations, especially in the global accumulation of energy and resource 
wealth. He explains that capital investment in resources, particularly in oil prospecting 
and exploration, by powerful economic actors gives them a large degree of control over 
the wealth of developing countries. Therefore, Obi (2009) contends that attributing the 
resource curse to numerical values based on abundance alone is too simplistic. Complex 
problems associated with resource endowment and resulting conflicts cannot be subjected 
to simple mathematical and statistical principles, ‘explanations and quick fixes’ (Obi, 
2009). This means Sachs and Warner’s (1995) contribution to the resource curse thesis 
based on GDP contribution to national income is too simplistic. Moreover, the resource 
curse theory lacks accuracy and has measurement errors (Ross, 2015). Is it possible, 
critics ask, to have a unifying variable that allows the resource curse theory to be applied 
anywhere and at any time?  
          The resource curse theory is dubbed simplistic, reductionist and above all 
ahistorical, especially with reference to colonialism and capitalism’s twinned histories 
(see Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi, 2009, 2010b; Watts, 2004). The approach excludes many 
factors which are important to understand the complex nature of conflicts in resource 
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endowed nations.  This requires a focus on internal socio-political and economic 
problems and how they affect national economies (Ayelazuno, 2014). For example, the 
resource curse thesis concentrates on the negative economic and political effects of 
poorly managed windfalls from resource rents (Ayelazuno, 2014). This emphasis on 
internality ignores complex geopolitical factors, the role of transnational oil corporations 
and their historical and ongoing coercive activities that are the cause of under-
development and the growth of some, but not all, resource-rich nations, as elaborated by 
Obi (2010a) and Ayelazuno (2014). Briefly stated, the abundance and scarcity narratives 
are too reductionist and economistic to explain the historical, political, and economic 
processes leading to the resource curse.  
        Additionally, there are historically close links between resource-endowed nations in 
sub-Saharan Africa and transnational oil corporations, multilateral organizations, and 
other forms of global governance of petro-capitalism and mineral extraction (Obi 2010a; 
Obi 2010b; Watts 2004). The governments of resource-rich nations control their 
resources through their national constitutions. As these nations’ social and economic 
policies attract powerful transnational corporations to invest in oil and other natural 
resource exploitation, transnational corporations end up in key positions in the chain of 
value creation (Bougrine, 2006). But transnational oil corporations frequently offer 
support only in exchange for the resource wealth of developing nations who are not the 
primary beneficiary. Given this complexity, an in-depth understanding of the resource 
curse requires a move away from simplistic, reductionist arguments and analysis that 
focuses on supply and demand logic.  
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         Thus far, I have elaborated on the resource curse thesis and the criticisms levelled 
against it. In my view, an alternative explanation of the conflict between the oil and gas 
industries and small-scale fisheries in Ghana requires intellectual resources beyond 
resource curse theories.  A focus on the historical geography of resource grabs, economic 
enclaves, and the creation of commodity frontiers in the Gulf of Guinea offers an 
alternative to the resource curse explanations. Historically, the Gulf of Guinea has been a 
dynamic geographic space with expanding resource commodification and trade of gold 
and slaves and the activities of transnational corporations. Though many resource nations 
in sub-Saharan Africa are without good governance, investors often prefer these mineral 
states to areas with good governance (Ferguson, 2006). Ferguson (2006) describes the 
resulting enclave forms of development that result from direct foreign investment and 
multinational corporate firms exploiting resources without any need for connections to 
the local economy for labour or materials. Enclaves, therefore, alienate local communities 
by concentrating jobs and economic benefits in foreign workers and corporations (Ackah-
Baidoo, 2013; Heeks, 1998).  
             Ferguson (2006) demonstrates that direct foreign investment is high in states 
without good governance like mineral rich Angola.  This directly contradicts the 
assumptions of the resource curse theory that posits a connection between economic 
performance and states with good governance, transparency and accountability.  It turns 
out oil can be most profitably exploited in war zones. According Ferguson, the states 
without good governance operate enclave models where private firms exploit minerals in 
a highly securitized zone legally created and policed by resource endowed states. The 
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enclave model of resource development relies on private investments from foreign firms 
who rely on foreign expertise, foreign materials and labour.  Ferguson also makes clear 
that a global network of resource enclaves can exist adjacent ungovernable spaces and 
local communities cut off from employment and other resource development benefits.  
Simply put, many nations in sub-Saharan Africa including Ghana operate on an enclave 
model of resource development where the state partners with and protects the interests of 
private foreign capital over the plight and concerns of resource adjacent communities. 
The enclave model evokes strong resistance from resource communities, however the 
resource curse theory ignores these resistant actors and their politics.   
      Table 2. 2. Table showing the main criticisms of the resource curse theory 
                    Main critics of the resource curse theory Key scholars 
1 The resource curse is deterministic and simplistic. The 
abundance and scarcity of resources are not the only 
determining factors. The resource curse cannot be 
attributed to numerical values of GNP and GDP 
contribution alone. The resource curse theory lacks 
accuracy and has measurement errors.  
Basedau, 2005 
Obi, 2009 
Ross, 2015 
2 The resource curse is ahistorical. It only focuses on 
internal socio-economic and political problems in 
resource rich nations, ignoring the role of coercive 
neocolonial pressures on resource-rich nations. 
Ayelazuno, 2014 
Obi, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b 
 
Watts, 2004 
3 Resource curse theory is reductionist. It ignores the role 
of global capitalism and the powerful institutions and 
individuals who monopolize control over the wealth of 
most states through processes of enclaves. 
Ayelazuno,2014. 
Obi, 2009, 2010a  
Ferguson, 2006 
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4 The resource curse analysis ignores how resources are 
socially constructed and controlled by powerful 
hegemonic forces in global capital accumulation.  
 Moore, 2016. 
Obi, 2009, 
2010ab. 
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Natural Resource Wealth and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Resource curse analysis are not limited to Ghana; they are widespread in the sub-Saharan 
African region. Explanations for the resource curse are not limited to fuel and non-fuel 
mineral resources in the sub-region. For example, Brass’s (2008) resource curse analysis 
of Djibouti focuses on its geo-strategic position, which generated huge revenue for the 
nation; however, its development prospects have not been realized because of the misuse 
of the windfalls. In addition, the initial analysis of the resource curse by Sach and Warner 
(1995, 1997) includes agriculture and forest products, but agricultural resources and 
forest products in sub-Saharan Africa have contributed less to development, and in many 
cases, have led to conflicts and poor economic growth, even though international 
development agencies and institutions such as the World Bank have promoted them 
(Alao, 2011; Sach & Warner, 1995). Civil wars and unrest in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire in 
the late 1990s caused by the enclosure of land for the commercial production of cocoa 
and rubber plantations are well-documented examples. This initial emphasis on the 
negative consequences of agriculture, forest products and tourist resources contrasts with 
contemporary resource curse analysis, which has mainly focused on fuel and non-fuel 
mineral resources.        
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           Economists have used developmental indicators such as GDP to explain resource 
curse tendencies. For example, Auty (1993, 1994), Sachs and Warner (1995), and 
Gylfason et al. (1999) describe a strong relationship between natural resource abundance 
and negative economic growth based on GDP. A statistical study by Sachs and Warner 
(1995) based on GDP contributions of natural resources between 1970 and 1990 shows a 
strong link between resource abundance and poor economic growth. Results from 95 
sampled resource-rich developing nations reveal that their economies have been 
negatively impacted despite the abundance of resources. Mauritius and Malaysia are the 
only nations where a moderate growth of GDP has been observed. Even some OPEC 
countries such as Venezuela, Mexico and Saudi Arabia and other mineral-exporting 
economies have showed a downward trend in GDP rates (Mikesell, 1997). Countries with 
agricultural resources outperform per capita income from countries economically 
dependent on minerals and oil (Auty 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). This 
is in contrast to the World Bank’s advice and the International Monetary Fund’s 
structural adjustment orientation, which favors mineral and oil development. 
           The poor GDP growth of oil and mineral-endowed nations has been attributed to 
the export of the resources in their primary state (unprocessed); this contributes less to 
alleviating poverty through employment in tertiary production and value-added industries 
(Humphrey et al., 2007).  Despite Nigeria’s oil richness, poverty is on the rise, with about 
50 percent of the country’s population living on less than US$1 a day (Obi, 2010a). 
Similarly, Equatorial Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have about 70 and 
50 percent of their populations, respectively, living in poverty despite vast oil and 
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mineral resource endowments and exports (Schaber, 2010). Botswana is an exception in 
the sub-Saharan region. The Botswanan government ensured that the country benefited 
by building export businesses from the massive diamond boom in the country between 
1970 and 1990. In addition, sound government policies and fiscal controls helped avoid 
the Dutch disease in Botswana.  
          Elaborating on the impact of government policies, political scientists (Amundsen, 
2014; Salai-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012) explain that resource rent impacts 
economic growth and development through bad/poor institutions, corruption and 
mismanagement, and conflicts. Resource rents hinder institutional quality; they act as an 
incentive to weaken the state system, allowing elites to gain access to resource rents 
(Amundsen, 2014). This resonates with Salai-i-Martin and Subramanian’s (2012) 
assertion that oil resources, not Dutch disease, are the reason for the poor institutional 
quality affecting the economic well-being of Nigerians. Amundsen (2014) argues that in 
a state with weakened institutions, the tax system and bureaucracy are ignored, property 
rights are violated, and there is little talk about investment, secondary processing and 
value-added resource sectors. Law and order and trusted institutions are required to 
capitalize on resource wealth. 
         Weakened institutional quality and civil society groups breed corruption and 
mismanagement in resource-endowed states (Ross, 2015). A study of the Nigerian oil 
curse reveals that weak/poor institutions, revenue mismanagement, and a lack of 
accountability led to corrupt practices in the Niger Delta region (Ukiwo, 2008). 
According to McFerson, (2010), the top oil-rich countries in Africa are also the top 
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ranked corrupt countries by Transparency International13. Nigeria and Somalia are the 
best-known examples in the sub-Saharan region of highly corrupt countries with resource 
wealth. Zeroing in on diamonds, Kabia (2008) contends that weak institutions due to 
authoritarianism led to heightened corruption and the mismanagement of rents from the 
‘blood diamonds14’ in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Poor institutional quality is also used to 
explain how President Steven Siaka gained the leeway needed to use the rents from the 
‘blood diamond’ trade to satisfy the needs of close allies and his extended family 
(Maconachie & Binns, 2007). As Pritchard, et al. (2014) explain, the significant revenue 
from resources can stabilize and strengthen authoritarian rule while weakening 
democracy. In his analysis of the diamond curse of Angola, Le Billion (2001b) stresses 
that rent in the hands of government enhanced incumbency and hence perpetuated 
authoritarianism. 
        Rents from resources have also aided conflicts and rebel activities on the sub-
continent (Collier, & Hoeffler, 2004; Kabia, 2008; Le Billion 2001b,). In the early and 
late 1990s, rents from diamond and oil-endowed states fueled conflicts and rebel 
activities in the DR Congo, Angola and Sierra Leone (Kabia, 2008; Le Billion 2001b; 
Maconachie & Binns, 2007). In Sierra Leone, armed civilians in the Revolutionary 
                                                
13	Transparency International is a global organization that aims to campaign and fight corruption in 
many developing and resource-endowed nations.  It uses the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to 
rank nations based on their level of corruption. It ranks nations on a scale of 0 to 10. Level 0 indicates 
a high rate of corruption, whiles 10 indicates a lower corruption rate.  
14 ‘Blood diamond’ has been used to describe conflict over diamonds, their extraction and the revenue 
generated, for example, when diamonds are bought and sold to purchase weapons and help fund 
conflicts. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) controlled the diamond-producing 
sector and used the revenue generated to purchase weapons (Kabia 2008).  
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United Front (RUF) agitated for a change of government, citing corruption and the 
mismanagement of diamond rents. The RUF used revenue from blood diamonds to 
finance their quest for change through civil war (Kabia, 2008). Accounts of ethnic 
violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria show how suppression in the face of weak 
institutions can lead to violence in resource-rich nations. Most of these conflicts stem 
from monopolized resource control and the marginalization of indigenous communities 
adjacent to resources (Watts 2004, Obi 2009). 
 
Resource Curse Applied to the Fish and Oil Conflict in the Western Region of 
Ghana 
 
 From the review of the experiences of resource-endowed nations in sub-Saharan Africa, 
it is clear that adverse impacts from the exploitation of natural resources are widespread. 
As Watts (2004) puts it, the adverse consequences of natural resources ‘appear 
inevitable’ in the current capitalist world system. The negative impacts of natural 
resource exploitation on national economies, communities, and human development are 
enormous. Kopiniski et al. (2013) argue that Ghana has learned from the economic 
problems associated with the long history of gold mining in the country. They stress that 
the country’s stabilized political systems have allowed the diversification of the oil 
revenue and focus to move away from gold into cocoa, timber and other agricultural food 
plantations for local and export markets; this will ensure the nation avoids the resource 
curse. However, the threat of the resource curse looms in the emerging oil and gas sector 
in Ghana. This section of the paper examines resource curse findings such as corrupt 
government practices, mismanagement of oil revenue, and conflicts between oil and gas 
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industries and small-scale fisheries in neighbouring communities in Ghana. Also, it 
reflects on enclaves of exclusion and a historicity the resource curse theory ignores. 
Ghana like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted the Angolan 
enclave model of natural resource exploitation to promote direct foreign investment in oil 
and gas exploitation. Under this model, the state uses its sovereign power to provide legal 
guarantees providing private firms access to resources and resource rent. Property rights 
allowing for commercial oil and gas exploration and exploitation in Ghana since 2010 
have been enshrined in the national constitution. Constitutional provisions give 
government the power to explore and exploit oil and gas resources and allocate these 
rights to foreign corporations. Article 257(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
(1992) states: ‘Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, 
rivers, streams, watercourses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and any 
area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the Republic of 
Ghana and shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of 
Ghana.’ The constitutional provision and petroleum laws immediately enacted after oil 
was discovered in Ghana’s coastal region give the state the prerogative to assign specific 
resource locations as ‘national geographic’ grounds (Chalfin, 2015) and allocate these 
resources to investors to generate revenue through an oil complex. According to Watts 
(2004), the oil complex in Nigeria is an organized network of social, political and 
economic forces with an interest in keeping petroleum resources flowing. This includes 
several levels of actors; the Ministry of Energy, the National Petroleum Corporation and 
the army to keep the oil and revenue from its exploitation flowing.   
	65	
        The Ghanaian oil complex comprises of a consortium of multinational oil 
corporations, the British company Tullow Oil, American oil firms Kosmos Energy and 
Anadarko, as well as some minor players from Ghana. The partners in the venture include 
the state represented by the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), the navy 
and a small minority of chiefs and assemblymen15. GNPC awards concessionary rights 
and contracts to Transnational Corporations (TNC) mentioned above and ensures the 
government gets royalties and taxes; the navy protects oil and gas infrastructure to ensure 
a continuous flow of oil revenue to state and non-state actors. The navy also ensures that 
‘no go’ zones around oil rigs are honored, and oil and gas infrastructures are strictly 
protected to generate revenue. 
         a.) Evidence of Resource Curse 
         The new oil and gas industry has brought development in politics, governance, and 
education, along with massive direct investments by local and foreign business firms 
(Gatsi, 2017). However, the most significant impact on the nation of offshore oil 
development has been in the economy. Since oil and gas exploitation began, there have 
been massive GDP contributions to the Ghanaian economy. As of 2014, the oil and gas 
sector contributed to a GDP growth rate of 7.2 percent. This is low compared to the 
previous rates of 8.2 percent in 2013 and 7.7 percent in 2012 (GSS 2014). The revenue 
impact of oil and gas has also been significant. Revenue accrued from oil and gas 
increased from US$444 million in 2011 to US$978 million in 2014 (GHETTI report 
                                                
15 Assemblymen are government representatives at the grassroots level in Ghana’s decentralized 
government system. 
	66	
2014). The GDP and revenue contribution from oil and gas exploitation and other sectors 
translated into an overall national growth rate of 4 percent in 2014. This is lower than the 
7.3 percent recorded in 2013, but the drop was caused by collapsing world oil prices. 
Moreover, the growth rate and increase in revenue are significant enough to aid 
development activities and government projects such as funding free senior high school 
education and infrastructural development (GHEITI report, 2014)16.  
       However, there is a high rate of corruption and missue of oil revenue in Ghana, as in 
many resource-endowed countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In spite of governance and 
institutional strategies to avoid the resource curse, Ghana is ranked 7th in sub-Saharan 
Africa and 56 out of 168 in the world transparency corruption index for 2015, scoring 47 
out of 100 (GII report, 2015). It declined by one percentage point from the 48 points 
scored in 2014, but the performance is better than in 2012 when it scored 45 points and in 
2013 when it scored 46 points. However, per the report released by the Ghana Integrity 
Initiative (GII), a local agency of Transparency International, the country’s score on the 
world transparency corruption index is poor. Ghana, like two-thirds of the countries 
assessed, scored below 50 out of 100 (GII Press statement, 2015 17). A score below 50 is 
considered a sign of corruption. 
                                                
16 The Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) is the Ghana subset of the global 
extractive initiative aimed at following due process and achieving transparency in payments by 
extractive industry transnational companies to government officials.  
http://www.gheiti.gov.gh/site/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=26
8:gheiti-2014-oil-a-gas-report-booklet&id=35:mining-oil-a-gas-reports&Itemid=54  
17 Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) is the local chapter of Transparency International established in 
1999. It is a non-partisan, non-profit civil organization focused on addressing corruption 
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       Further, resource rents from the oil sector are misused and appropriated at the 
national level before reaching the local level despite strict measures to curb this 
corruption. Government agencies and ministries have come under attack for the misuse of 
oil revenue meant to promote national economic development. IMANI Ghana’s mid-
2016 governance report (2015) in the wake of the December 2016 elections indicates the 
misuse of US$1.6 billion between 2012 and 2016 by the government. Discrepancies in 
the spending of ministries, agencies and departments and outright theft are ignored and 
left unchecked (IMANI 2016)18. The Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC)19 for oil revenue found mismanagement of oil revenue in the northern region of 
Ghana. The PIAC 2014 and 2015 reports said amounts of Ghc15,000 ($5500) and 
Ghc20,000 ($7000), earmarked for the rehabilitation and creation of canals around the 
Nakore Dam in the Wa municipality and the construction of a six-unit classroom block at 
the Farikiya Islamic Institute in the Upper East region of the country, were not spent on 
these projects (PIAC report, 2015)20. While the figures may seem small, remember that 
the GDP per capita income in Ghana is $1,340.4 – just over $3.50/day – as of the latest 
statistics collected in 2015 (Budget of Ghana, 2015).  
    
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.gheiti.gov.gh/site/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=26
8:gheiti-2014-oil-a-gas-report-booklet&id=35:mining-oil-a-gas-reports&Itemid=54    
18 IMANI Ghana Centre for policy and education is the local subset of IMANI Africa, a policy think 
tank that researches and provides objective, critical and independent analysis on national issues   
http://www.imaniafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/IMANI-GHANA-MID-YEAR-REPORT-
FINAL.pdf  
19 The Public Interest and Accountability Committee was established under the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act to provide an independent assessment of the management and use of oil revenue.   
20 See the full details of the reportage on http://citifmonline.com/2016/07/24/piac-uncovers-misuse-of-
oil-revenue-in-northern-ghana/  
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    b)  Oil and Gas Development as an enclave of exclusion. 
            Since 2010, conflicts have developed between small-scale fisheries (SSF) and the 
Jubilee field partners in the western region of Ghana. The western region is one of ten 
regions of Ghana and has a population of about 2.4 million people (GSS, 2010). The 
region is considered rural21 with the majority of the population being farmers and fishers 
living in coastal and farming communities. The fishery workers have depended on the sea 
since the pre-colonial era; they have a communal system of ownership that is held in trust 
by the chief or the ‘Apofohenes’, the local custodians of the sea.  
The conflicts between the oil and gas industries and small-scale fisheries stem 
from the encroachment of oil and gas activities on traditional fishing grounds and the 
enclave nature of resource exploitation which alienates coastal communities shutting 
them out of jobs and other opportunities to benefit from oil development. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has regulations for oil and gas 
operations that require the demarcation of a 500 m radius around oil rigs and a 2 km 
buffer around other infrastructure designated as ‘no go’ zones for fishing (Arbo & Thuy, 
2016). This is meant to protect oil and gas infrastructure and to keep people safe. But 
according to Watts (2004), the no-go zones are a strategy of enclosure and repression 
used by governments on behalf of multinational corporations to maximize profit by 
excluding competing uses (Watts, 2004). The regulation also requires that oil and gas 
activities use lighting systems at specified intensities to protect oil rigs. However, fishery 
                                                
21 The western region has about 57.6 percent of the population living in rural settings; 42.4 percent 
live in urban settings (PHC, 2010).  
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workers complain that the strong lighting from the oil rigs attract fish into the ‘no-go’ 
zones, dramatically reducing their catch.  
          Crucially, ocean space has been enclosed for oil and gas development but 
transnational corporations (Jubilee partners) have done little to develop adjacent resource 
communities. One weakness of the resource curse thesis is that it ignores the influence of 
transnational corporations (TNC) and the negative impacts they have on resource 
communities. The direct foreign investment and resource extraction by the exploitation 
firms is disconnected from the local economy. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
of transnational oil corporations is geared towards satisfying global demands for return 
on investment at the expense of local benefits, since regulations do not require CSR for 
oil and gas firms (Andrew, 2013). Among the consortium of oil-exploiting companies 
(Jubilee Partners) in the region and the country, the British company Tullow Oil has 
played a significant role in sponsoring local workers for job training and offering 
scholarships to Ghanaian students for further studies abroad. However, other co-operating 
parties have not done the same, arguably because corporate social responsibilities are not 
enshrined in contracts signed with the government agency, the Ghana National Petroleum 
Company (GNPC) (Andrew, 2013).  
           Fishing and land rights, women and children’s activities, the livelihood of fishers, 
and an important food source are all threatened by oil and gas exploitation (Obeng-
Odoom, 2014). Local people have nothing to show for the loss of access to the ocean. 
The local communities’ participation in decision making and oil and gas exploitation 
activities is minimal since enclaves offer little chance for indigenous people to have a say 
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in how resource development proceeds. Benefits come in the form of financial windfalls 
from taxes and royalties to the state, and these do not go directly to the adjacent 
communities (See Bridge, 2009; Panford, 2014). The government uses its constitutional 
power and the National Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NPRA) to accumulate wealth 
while the local communities suffer rising prices and costs of living.                   
         In a study of gold mining in Ghana, Hilson (2002) points out that conflicts 
proliferate whenever there are exclusions from wealth generated by the extractive 
industry. Youth and fishery workers22 do not find employment in the oil and gas sector 
and opportunities for fishing livelihoods are lost through enclosure (GNA 2011; Joy 
News, 2011). Grievances were heightened in 2010 after parliament rejected the chief and 
traditional council of the western region’s petition for a 10 percent share of the oil 
revenue to be allocated to the region for its development (Gatsi. 2017, GNA 2011; Joy 
News 2011). The chief and the elders believe the region has made enormous 
contributions to the nation since it is the hub of the nation’s resource wealth (gold and 
oil). The vast majority of Ghana’s main exports, such as gold, diamonds, timber, cocoa 
and now oil, are produced in the western region, yet many people are impoverished in a 
region full of profitable commodity frontiers. The petition from traditional government 
representatives was rejected, and the Ghanaian government continues to encourage and 
enforce the flow of oil extraction.  
                                                
22	The term ‘fishery workers’ is applied to both men and women who catch and process fish. Men do 
the work of harvesting; the women do the processing and fish trading (see Johnson and Bakakki in 
Murton et al. 2016)  
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        The youth and opinion leaders of Cape Three Points and many towns along the coast 
have resisted the activities of the Jubilee Partners, as documented in the local media (see 
Today online news, 2010). The resistance is against unequal power relations, the 
inequitable distribution of rents, appropriation of land, enclosure of the fishing grounds 
and environmental degradation. A militant group called the ‘Cape Militia’ formed in 
2010, mirroring militant activities in the Niger Delta. The group serves as the official 
mouthpiece of aggrieved unemployed youth and fishers in the communities (Today 
online news, 2010). The group also aims to attack oil pipelines under the seabed, bridges, 
and other infrastructures that the Jubilee field partners have constructed. However, the 
government has been quick to deny the group’s formation and existence (Today, October 
2010). Though the magnitude of conflicts and militancy might not match that of the 
Niger Delta region, militant groups pose a significant threat. There is a local saying that 
‘Asem kese reba na frankaa si so’, which translates as ‘coming events cast their shadows 
before them.' In other words, the activities of this group point to a larger impending 
conflict. The militancy cannot be denied; nor can traditional leaders be ignored. The 
aggrieved youth aim to fight for their rights and their share of the oil revenue or, if this 
does not work, to regain access to livelihoods that rely on the sea. One leader was quoted 
in a local newspaper as saying, ‘We will give a forewarning to avoid casualties as our 
intention is only to bring down those symbols of oppression and injustice’ (Today, 
October 2010). His comment refers to the oil infrastructure. To cite an example, the 
problems posed by the oil and gas exploitation follow the trends of the socio-economic, 
political and environmental difficulties that gold mining posed to resource communities 
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in the same region historically (Hilson, 2002). This history is left unaddressed by 
explanations emanating from resource curse theories.     
          In conclusion, the current oil price volatility makes it difficult to rely on oil and gas 
exports for economic stability and development. In 2015, Ghana’s budget was 
significantly affected by oil price declines, partly because the economy has come to rely 
on the revenue from the oil and gas industry, much like other developed regions in the 
world (Budget of Ghana, 2015). In 2015, the price of oil was around US$57 per barrel. In 
addition, Ghanaian gas infrastructure for commercial production continues to face 
challenges; hence, the government has reduced financing for gas projects (Ghana 
Petroleum Revenue Report, 2015). Furthermore, Ghana’s economic standing has 
worsened due to dramatic reductions in the price of the country's third major export - 
cocoa (Budget of Ghana, 2015). At times, the country seems financially unable to provide 
for the needs of its citizens, yet oil and gas continue to be prioritized over traditional 
economic activities such as fishing, which has served people for hundreds of years and 
provides basic food security in the western region and in the nation as a whole. Petroleum 
prices since 2016 have swung between US$27 and US$42 (OPEC 2016). With this oil 
price volatility, it is easy to make a case for fishing as a more stable and historically 
continuous backbone of Ghanaian society. The policy of putting oil before fish is 
‘economic suicide;’ there is no place for the vast number of unskilled laborers in the 
technologically intensive oil and gas industry. The nation could depend on small-scale 
fishing activities for food security, revenue and employment, but only if the conflict is 
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ended and fishing can occur alongside oil and gas extraction which ISO standards make 
impossible. 
Conclusion 
        Ghana is a resource-rich nation with a growing oil and gas sector. This sector has 
served as the backbone of the country’s economy since it took over from gold and cocoa 
as the leading GDP contributor and source of foreign revenue generation in 2010. 
Nevertheless, the impacts of the growing oil and gas sector come at a cost to food and 
fishing activities with the enclosure of the fishing commons in favor of oil and gas 
extraction. Oil and gas commercialization since 2010 has enclosed the ocean space, with 
the SSF kept at a distance. The social, economic and political impacts of the growing oil 
and gas industry have resulted in conflicts between the activities of SSF and the Jubilee 
Partners.  
       The resource curse literature offers some useful insights into resource conflicts, 
framing them as caused by greedy human nature and weak institutional structures that are 
unable to fairly distribute windfalls from abundant resources to benefit all in society. But 
while the theory provides good explanations for how oil becomes a curse it fails to take a 
longer historical and geographical look at resource grabs tied to enclaves and commodity 
frontiers at the coast. The resource curse theory explains conflicts in the context of 
capitalist logics, but lacks the context of Ghana’s colonial history or the capitalist world 
system of which it has been a part since the 15th century. The resource curse focuses on 
internal economic factors, ignoring colonial relations and global economic forces in 
resource extraction and the development of capitalism (Ayelazuno 2014; Moore, 2017a).  
	74	
         To understand the conflict between the oil and gas industries and small-scale 
fisheries, Furlong et al. (2015) stress the need for resource violence to be examined 
beyond the resource curse—they advocate framing the curse as a ‘resource grab.’ 
Resource grabs are produced by enclosures and exclusions when rules of control, 
management and rights are changed from favoring local to global actors. Resource 
development needs to be seen in relational terms; on the one side, we have the resource 
community, and on the other, we have those with an interest in resource extraction 
(grabbing).  The Gulf of Guinea, for example, attracts non-state actors, such as powerful 
transnational corporate and (neo)colonial institutional actors (IMF, WB), who grab 
resources; they are agents of frontier expansion and help to strengthen capitalist relations.  
A broader understanding of the conflict between oil and fish must consider the historical 
resource grabs and appropriation tied to colonialism and contemporary resource 
exploitation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Fish and Oil Conflict in the Gulf of Guinea, Ghana: Thinking Beyond the Resource 
Curse 
   
Abstract 
Efforts to enhance economic growth through natural resource development in Ghana 
have led to the enclosure and commodification of the country’s coastal zone in the 
western region. This commodification of maritime space has appropriated fish and 
fishing places from small-scale fisheries that now have to compete with oil and gas 
industries in the use of the coastal zone. In the resource curse literature on sub-Saharan 
Africa, researchers have explained resource conflicts as emanating from the abundance of 
resources in countries without good governance. This can rightly be applied to the 
conflicts between the fish and oil activities in the Western region of Ghana. However, 
researchers have critique the resource curse theory, stressing that it focuses on internal 
socio-economic and political factors, ignoring the historical geography of colonialism 
and capitalism. As an alternative explanation to the resource curse in Ghana, this paper 
suggests that the conflict can be better understood through the historical geography of 
resource grabs tied to enclave development and commodity frontiers in the country. The 
paper uses the toponymy of maps of the Gulf of Guinea from 1500-2015 to trace 
historical resource grabs brought on by European colonialism and to put into context the 
transformation of the coast from a national fishing place and a national fishing basket into 
an oil and gas space.  The paper argues that understanding the historical geography of 
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commodity frontiers in the Gulf of Guinea provides a better explanation for conflicts 
between oil and fish than the resource curse theory.   
Keywords; Oil and gas, Gulf of Guinea, Small-scale fisheries, enclave, commodity 
frontier, resource curse, resource grab. 
                                                           Introduction 
         After several years of offshore oil exploration activities, starting in the 1970s in the 
Western Gulf of Guinea basin of Ghana, commercial oil and gas production began on 
December 15, 2010, in the largest oil block, the Jubilee field23. The Jubilee oil field has 
transformed ocean space from its use as a source of food since the pre-colonial era in the 
2nd century into an oil commodity frontier in the 21st century. This evolution is consistent 
with Steinberg’s (2001) typology of ocean space. According to Steinberg, ocean space 
has different uses that offer diverse options for commodification:  
 [There are] several ideal-type constructions of ocean space; a non-territorial 
‘Indian Ocean’ construction in which the sea is constructed as an asocial space 
between societies, a highly territorial ‘Micronesian’ construction in which the sea 
is managed as an extension of land-space and a complex ‘Mediterranean’ 
construction in which the sea is defined as a non-possessable but nonetheless a 
legitimate arena for expressing and contesting social power… In the industrial 
era, the key economic activity shifted from circulation across space to investment 
in specific production and consumption sites. The coastal sea, like land was 
perceived as a potential site of intensive investment and so was incorporated 
within the territory of the state. (2001, p. 206) 
 
 
  
                                                
23 The Jubilee oil field is named after the golden Jubilee independence anniversary of Ghana. 
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The discovery of abundant hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Guinea at the end of the 
millennium attracted a host of oil-consuming nations, transnational oil corporations, and 
multilateral organizations. The US, for example, turned away from the Gulf States and 
focused its attention on the Gulf of Guinea after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
on New York and Washington. Texas-based US oil company Kosmos Energy arrived at 
the coast of Ghana in 2007 and discovered oil in fields where others had failed. Kosmos 
Energy was later joined by other national oil companies, including the Irish-based Tullow 
Oil and Anadarko. Despite the corruption, political instability and poor administration 
prevalent in the African sub-region (Soares de Oliveira, 2007), these transnational 
corporations invested billions of dollars in oil exploration and exploitation as Ghana was 
perceived to be relatively well-governed in a region known for oil conflicts—most 
notoriously the Niger Delta in Nigeria. The high inflow of direct foreign investment in 
Ghana follows the model of enclave development as outlined by Ferguson (2006).  
Enclave development occurs when mineral rich nations are exploited by private foreign 
investors who find it profitable to operate in the presence of conflict and poor governance 
by providing high levels of private and national security in resource extraction zones to 
enable ongoing resource exploitation. Adjacent communities and national economies do 
not benefit from resource wealth as enclave development involves importing foreign 
management and workers as well as supplies (Ferguson, 2006). Thus, enclave 
development is driven by a global network of resource prospectors and explorers who 
collaborate with national governments and international institutions to accumulate 
resource rents from resource rich nations. Enclaves lead to the alienation of resource 
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communities and under-developed local economies, as inputs, labor and other equipment 
needed to explore and produce resources are imported by foreign private firms from 
elsewhere, while the resources exploited are exported unprocessed (See Ackah-Baidoo, 
2013, Ferguson, 2006; Heeks, 1998).  
              Before the discovery of oil, the western Gulf of Guinea was a well-known 
fishing commons. The coastal zone served as an important source of employment, with 
the livelihood of fish workers24 and entire coastal communities dependent on the sea for 
their culture and survival. Fisheries resources are a crucial component of the country’s 
food security, contributing up to 60 percent of the overall protein consumed by 
Ghanaians (Adusah-karikari, 2015; Agyei et al, 2012; Boohene and Peprah 2010). The 
implementation of Exclusive Economic Zone regulations based on the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the 1980s, nationalized and 
commodified fishery resources within a 200-mile limit, focusing on the export of highly 
valued species such as tuna.    
          This nationalization of the coastal zone and the creation of the EEZ helped to 
transform ocean spaces into manageable commodified zones, first oriented towards 
offshore industrial scale fisheries resources and later towards industrial oil development. 
The latter has had profound effects on the livelihood of small-scale fishery workers in 
western Ghana (Adusah-Karikari, 2015; Boohene and Peprah, 2010). The resultant 
                                                
24 In this paper, fishers and those who work processing fish have the same meaning and are used 
interchangeably. The term ‘fish harvester’ is not used as it applies to professional fishery workers who 
catch fish using industrial means. Rather, it refers to both men and women who do the harvesting, 
processing and fish trading themselves (see Johnson and Bakaaki in Murton et al. 2016).  
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resistance and conflicts between the fishers and the oil and gas industry over ocean space 
are consistent with Steinberg’s (2000) understanding of constructions of ocean space as 
an ‘arena of social conflict25.’ This conflict stems from enclave development and the 
violence of appropriation and the forms of representation that enable and accompany 
colonialism and capitalism as historical and geographic forces (Moore 2017a). 
       In the African sub-region, places such as Nigeria where resource conflicts have 
occurred, are explained using the resource curse theory (Obi 2010a). The negative 
impacts of oil and gas exploitation in the Western region of Ghana can be situated within 
the context of sub-Saharan Africa but scholars assert that the resource curse theory has 
focused on internal socio-economic and national governance problems that take the scale 
of the nation and national sovereignty for granted (Ayelazuno, 2014). Researchers have 
criticized such approaches as being uncritical of global capitalist relations and ahistorical 
(Ayelauno 2014, Obi 2009, 2010a; Watts 2004). Researchers have also attacked the 
resource curse theory for ignoring history and downplaying the power of capital to ignite 
colonial and imperial rivalry and violence. 
The maps and charts of the Western Gulf of Guinea tell a different story to that of 
the resource curse. Maps from the 16th century onward illustrate a shifting history of 
diverse commodity uses and international triangular trade along the coast. Maps and the 
                                                
25 An arena of social conflict is a space which is highly contested due to its resource potential (see 
Steinberg, 2001). 
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names on maps (toponymy)26 are useful guides for understanding what is valued by those 
in positions of economic and political power. The defining power of maps is expressed 
through toponymy, whereby specific meanings are attached to distinct locations (Cloke et 
al., 2005; Harley, 1989). Maps and charts of the Gulf of Guinea’s littoral illustrate 
varying toponymies over time. Names such as the Ivory Coast, Gold Coast, Slavery Coast 
and Grain Coast appear on European colonial maps using the Mercator projection 
(Crosby 1997: Moore, 2017b) from the 16th century. The Mercator projection embodies a 
topographically flat view of space, a linear view of time and a strict separation between 
nature and society (Moore, 2017b). The toponymies on the Mercator projections of the 
region signify resource availability and the colonial capitalist ability to promote 
commodity trade along the littoral. The toponymy of maps helps to explain the relevance 
of gold, slaves, ivory and grain to European empires. The different names show that the 
Gulf of Guinea was more than a fishing ground before the oil and gas domestication 
agenda emerged at the close of the last millennium.  
         Internationally, the toponymy of the Gulf of Guinea now focuses on oil and gas and 
there is little interest in or knowledge of fishing and other uses of the ocean space. The 
shift in attention from major oil exploitation regions in the Middle East including the 
Persian Gulf and the Atlantic Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of Guinea has ‘catapulted the 
Gulf of Guinea to geopolitical stardom’ (Soares de Oliveira, 2007; 5). However, the rise 
                                                
26	Toponymy is used in cartography to describe places and names of geographical space and its origin. 
It is used to demarcate economic activities, political positions and places on maps (Harley, 1989; 
Kadmon, 2004).	
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of the ‘new Gulf of Guinea’ as an oil and gas space and the appropriation of the fishing 
commons is merely part of a long series of resource appropriation and processes of 
enclave development (Ferguson, 2006).  
           The Gulf of Guinea’s ocean space has historically been a commodity frontier tied 
to colonial empires and resource appropriation (Beinart & Hughes, 2007; Moore, 2000, 
2017a) or ‘resource grabs’. Using the toponymy of maps, this paper suggests that an 
alternative way to understand the conflict between the oil and gas industries and the 
small-scale fisheries is to examine it from the perspective of the historical geography of 
resource grabs tied to enclaves and commodity frontiers. Thus, the paper moves from the 
resource curse thesis narratives to discuss how conflicts are produced through historical 
resources grabs tied to colonial empires at the coast and modern-day resource grabs tied 
to enclave development that can profitably exist alongside corruption, violent conflict and 
poor governance contrary to the resource curse theory. 
 
Resource Grabs, Enclaves and Capitalist Development through Commodity 
Frontiers  
 
        Despite the important contribution of resource curse theory to conflict analysis, 
Furlong and Norman (2015) say abundance and scarcity narratives as applied by scholars 
from the resource curse theoretical position do not adequately explain resource violence 
and conflicts. However, increasing attention has been paid to resource violence and 
conflicts by scholars who recognize global resource grabs on land and at sea (Furlong and 
Norman, 2015). Resource grabs are features of power struggles between conflicting users 
who desire to control and use natural resources (Tietengberg and Lewis, 2000). Scholars 
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have studied both land grabbing (Hall 2013; Borras et al., 2012) and ocean grabbing 
(Bennett et al, 2015; Franco et al. 2014; Knott and Neis, 2016), but there is no clear 
consensus on what constitutes a resource grab (Borras et al., 2012).  
       The idea of resource grabbing has been used to define shifts in the control of natural 
resources, dating back to the enclosure of agricultural land in Britain from the 14th to the 
18th century. McDonagh and Griffin (2015) explain that the enclosure of the land created 
a property-right regime depriving the indigenous and original users of the land. In recent 
times, researchers explain that enclosures are carried out by states, non-state investors 
and actors who prioritize development plans and make huge financial investments in 
natural resources, appropriating them from their original users (Furlong & Norman, 2015; 
Rulli et al. 2013). Ferguson (2006) asserts that the sovereign power of states to provide 
legal authority to extractive firms and the militarization of security produce development 
enclaves that attract direct foreign investments in resource rich nations. Further, he 
explains that political instability, and civil wars do not interfere with such forms of 
development but can be attractive to foreign firms (Ferguson, 2006). Furlong & Norman 
(2015) argue that resource grabs produce violence through enclosure and exclusion, 
mostly in communities adjacent to sites of resource extraction. Crucially, this has 
extended the scope of violence and conflict analysis to include land and oceanic 
resources (Norman & Furlong, 2015). 
       In the recent discourses on fisheries, ocean grabbing has been used to describe a wide 
variety of conservation and fisheries management practices that appropriate fishing space 
from coastal communities and traditional users (Franco et al.,2015; Knott & Neis 2015, 
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UNO 2012). According to Bennett et al., ‘Ocean grabbing refers to the dispossession or 
appropriation of use, control or access to the ocean space or resources from prior users, 
rights holders or inhabitants’ (Bennett et al., 2015:63). Spaces and resources are 
appropriated through legal or extra-legal means in the form of enclosures (Bennett et al., 
2015), primitive accumulation (Marx 1990), or accumulation through dispossession 
(Harvey, 1993). Ocean space and its resources such as fish species and hydrocarbons are 
appropriated and controlled by powerful hegemonic forces who decide on their use and 
management (Franco et al., 2014). Resource appropriation transfers the ownership, use 
rights, and control over once publicly owned resources or even those without ownership 
in the form of commons from the poor majority (Fairhead et al 2012; Furlong & Norman, 
2015). National governments, for example, implement fisheries policies and reforms to 
enhance economic development that exclude marginalized groups and indigenous coastal 
communities (Bennett et al., 2015). 
Exacerbating the issue, financial investment in fisheries by non-state corporate 
actors encouraged by international institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund re-allocate fisheries and ocean space to market actors (Franco et al., 
2014; Bennett et al., 2015). These powerful forces focus on maximizing profit from the 
use of the ocean, to the detriment of small-scale food fisheries. Profit maximization 
through privatization converts the ocean commons into property, with a negative effect 
on the cultural identity and livelihood of indigenous fishing communities (Franco et al., 
2014). This entails the transfer of lands and waters to private owners. Fairhead et al., 
(2012) assert that in the context of natural resources, profit maximization motives mean 
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depriving communities of their resource rights. This commodifies ocean space and limits 
access. The ocean grabbing literature has extensively been applied to fisheries and 
aquaculture development plans and reforms (Franco et al., 2014; Knott and Neis, 2015), 
but the theory can be applied to the capitalist appropriation of the fishing livelihood of 
indigenous coastal communities along the Gulf of Guinea littoral as well.  
        The appropriation of spaces and goods into property creates a shifting cycle of 
commodity frontiers, as discussed by Braudel (1972, 1981) and Hopkins and Wallerstein 
(1986) in their work on capitalism as a world system. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986) 
explain commodity frontiers as locations where labor and raw materials are transformed 
into goods for sale. They demonstrate that commodity frontiers follow a chain that 
establishes a link between the products being traded and the efforts of capital and labor 
that are appropriated to contribute to create the products. Building on the earlier ideas of 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986), Moore describes frontiers in two ways: (1) ‘a zone 
beyond which further expansion is possible,’ and (2) a ‘kind of space with forward 
movement of [the] capitalist system’ emphasizing advancing commodification (Moore 
2000; 412). According to Moore, the two explanations of commodity frontiers emphasize 
that the expansion of capitalist relations is possible as long as there is free space and labor 
available that are not yet commodified. Therefore, new possibilities for the creation of 
commodity frontiers always exist but rely on enclosure or appropriation by dispossession.  
           Similarly, in explaining how capitalism transforms the resources of a region into 
commodities, Beinart and Hughes (2007) stress that commodity frontiers refer to 
historical European trade, settlement and productive enterprises that focus on exploiting 
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resources in overseas territories, transitioning them into commodity forms that enable the 
creation of frontiers. Establishing a link between the resources appropriated by colonial 
forces and commodity frontiers, Moore (2010) says earlier capitalist relations formed 
new commodity frontiers in the 16th century after urban capital was forced out of Europe 
to where land and labor could be appropriated freely. The link between colonialism and 
commodity frontiers is best understood by situating capitalism as a historical-
geographical process that transforms space and societies through appropriation and 
exploitation dynamics and the commodification of human and extra-human natures (see 
Moore, 2010; 2017a, 2017b).  
The toponymy of the maps of the Gulf of Guinea coast illustrate what European 
colonists valued, and their naming of the Gulf marks the onset of colonial-capitalist 
relations. The names on the map show the evolution of the commodity frontier, from 
slaves, to gold, ivory, fish, and fossil fuel, with commodities expropriated first by 
European colonial leaders and now by multinational oil and gas corporations and the 
nation state. Resource grabs tied to commodity frontiers and enclave development 
therefore, turns the narrow framings of the resource curse theory on its head, explaining 
how conflicts can be understood from the perspective of planned colonial and post-
colonial resource grabs rather than governance failures. 
         This paper argues that the conflicts between the small-scale fisheries and the oil and 
gas industries can be understood through the lens of the historical geography of the Gulf 
of Guinea. However, it does not consider the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) region in its entirety; 
rather, it focuses on the toponymy of the Ghanaian section of the region. Using the 
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toponymy of maps of GOG, the paper isolates and discusses specific historical 
commodities (gold and slaves) and the contemporary oil and gas extraction that have 
been central to the ongoing development of the Gulf of Guinea as a historical commodity 
frontier. It notes, however, that only oil and gas exploitation has appropriated ocean space 
from small-scale fisheries.  
        The first section of the paper provides background information on the Gulf of 
Guinea as it became a commodity frontier. The second section discusses capitalist trade 
and commodification along the coast as expressed in the toponymy of maps of the region 
after the arrival of the Europeans in the 15th century and the beginning of triangular trade 
in support of plantations in the new world. It examines the representation of ocean space 
as a means of transportation and as a site for trade establishments. The third section 
discusses oil and gas appropriation and enclosure of ocean space from small-scale fishers. 
It begins with an examination of oil and gas development and fisheries commercialization 
efforts after the implementation of the EEZ in the 1980s. The location of oil in the coastal 
zone inhibits fishing, something not associated with previous commodity frontiers. This 
raises issues of food security and sovereignty in a period of rapid capitalist development 
accompanied by environmental and social change. 
Toponymy of Commodity Frontiers in the Gulf of Guinea, Ghana, 1500-2017 
 
The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) is part of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the West African 
coast. The region is known for its numerous fish species (Marquette et al., 2002) and 
tremendous contributions to fish food security as shown on the map of the region created 
by Dutch cartographer Barent Langenes in 1612 (Figure 3.1). The region consists of 
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countries from three sub-regions in Africa: West, Southern and Central Africa, whose 
arm forms the GOG (shown in Figure 3.2). The region extends from Cape Lopez in 
Gabon near the equator to Cape Palmas in Liberia at 7o west (Akpan, 2013:16). Its 
extensive coastline includes the Bight of Benin and Biafra, while the rivers Volta and 
Niger drain into the Gulf of Guinea.  
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Figure 3.1.  Early stage map of the coastline of the Gulf of Guinea showing a fish species 
at the Gulf of Guinea. By; Barent Langenes (1612)  
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         The origins of the name Guinea are disputed. It has been associated with the 
surrounding ‘Guinea’ African States, ancient cities in West African states along the coast, 
and the Guinea forest in West Africa. It comes from the Berber word ‘aguinaw’ or 
‘gwana’ which refers to a black man or Negro; hence, the area relates to the land of black 
peoples as described by Arab traders (Akpan, 2013). Guinea is also said to have evolved 
from other names, such as ‘Jenne' or ‘Djenne’. ‘Jenne’ is a famous ancient city in the 
Mali Empire, a center of market activities between the Arabs from the north and the old 
southern West Africa states. The account of the names of Guinea described by Bovill 
(1995 cited in Hale 1997 and Akpan, 2013) conflicts with the assertion that the word 
Guinea is derived from ‘Ghana’ or ‘Gheneoa’. The name ‘Ghana’ or ‘Gheneoa’ is also 
said to have come from medieval Arab geographers who used it to describe the ancient 
empire that was said to have settled along the coast in the direction of the western branch 
of the river Niger (Akpan, 2013).   
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Figure 3.2 Modern map of the Gulf of Guinea coast (Rider, 2011). 
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There are several versions of the name ‘Guinea’ in the accounts of the European 
empires- France, England, the Netherlands and Portugal- who colonized and traded along 
the coast. From the 14th century onwards, European maps use different words, including 
‘Guinnia’, ‘Gheneoa’, ‘Ghinea’ and ‘Ginya’. The name ‘Ghana’ or ‘Gheneoa’ was used 
to refer to the coast next to the current state of Senegal by the Portuguese (Hussey, 1977 
cited in Akpan, 2013). The Catalan Atlas dated 1375 uses ‘Ginya’ (Bovill, 1995 cited in 
Hale 1997). Also, a map by Genoese cartographer Giovanni di Carignano dated 1320 
uses ‘Guinnia’ (Wolf, 1982).  
           The maps of the region also show a distinction between sections of the Gulf of 
Guinea coast. The southern shore of West Africa, which is also the north coast of the 
Gulf of Guinea, was named and known as ‘Upper Guinea’. The west coast of southern 
Africa to the east was called ‘Lower Guinea’. Hargreaves et al., (1991) explain that 
Upper Guinea can be traced from Cape Blanco in Senegal to Cape Shebro in Sierra 
Leone while the lower region extends from Shebro Island in Sierra Leone to the eastern 
end of the Gulf of Guinea at the Niger Delta (Hagreaves et al., 1991).  
            The toponymy of the GOG coast, with words such as ‘Ivory Coast’, ‘Gold Coast’, 
‘Slavery Coast’ and ‘Grain Coast’, is shown in a 1725 map by Hermann Moll (Figure 
3.3). The names are based on the commodities Europeans extracted from different 
locations along the Gulf of Guinea. In Lower Guinea, for example, three different goods 
were available in large quantities that shaped Europeans’ understanding of the coast from 
the 15th to the 19th centuries: ivory, gold, and slaves. Ivory from elephant tusks was 
dominant in the area stretching between Cape Palmas to Cape Three Points; The ‘Ivory 
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Coast’ covers present-day Cote D’Ivoire and was last colonized by the French, with the 
country gaining independence in 1960.  
 
Figure 3.3; Historical map showing sections of the GOG coast made by Dutch 
Cartographer Hermann Moll c.1725.   
Source; https://tracingafricanroots.wordpress.com/lower-guinea/  
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Gold was also commonly traded at the east end of Cape Three Points. This region 
came to be known as the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast covers modern-day Ghana and 
Cape Three Points, now a famous landmark for the oil industry.  Slave trading activities 
were dominant along the coast between the rivers Niger and Volta beginning in the 15th 
century. The region had many people violently captured during wars and held captives; 
this practice enhanced the Atlantic slave trade. Hence, that area was called the ‘Slavery 
Coast’ in the late 17th and most of the 18th centuries. The region covers modern-day 
portions of Benin (formerly Dahomey), Togo, southwestern Ghana and the southwestern 
corner of Nigeria. Put otherwise, the toponymy reflects the commodities available at each 
of the locations along the GOG.  
Arrival of the Europeans: Gold and Slave Grabs at the Coast and Commodity 
Frontiers 
 
          In the 15th century, the Portuguese arrived at the coast of West Africa and started 
their exploration from upper Guinea. They had extensive knowledge and experience of 
the wealth of the Atlantic coast and had been granted a charter by the Pope to embark on 
trade exploration in African and Asia. Their main interest was in Asia, but to reach Asia 
they had to pass through Africa through the Gulf of Guinea; they hoped to meet gold 
miners in the ancient Ghana and Mali empires to divert the trans-Saharan gold trade from 
the Arabs who were heavily involved (Akpan, 2013). By the late 15th century, the 
Portuguese discovered that the Gold Coast was the main source of gold on the West 
African coast. In 1471, the Portuguese captain Prince Henry the Navigator and explorers 
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Juan de Santerem and Pedro d’ Escobar arrived at the coast of Ghana between the mouth 
of rivers Ankobra and Volta (Agbodeka, 1992).  
          When the Portuguese arrived at the coast, they established several commodity 
frontiers expressed in the toponymy of the maps. The colonial trade focused on gold, 
slaves and ivory, as well as the production of sugar, cotton, cacao, rubber and other crops. 
The Portuguese used the sea for trade purposes. During the period, the ocean space was 
not appropriated. Rather, it was a site for the establishment of forts and castles as 
warehouses for the gold and slave commodity trade. It was also an important means of 
transporting commodities to Europe and the new world.  
        The commencement of trade was fueled by the discovery of the vast deposits of gold 
at the coast (Decorse, 1992). The southern part of modern-day Ghana, west of the Volta 
region, is dominated by two geological formations—the Tarkwain and Birimian systems. 
These were formed 2,200 million years ago (Agbodeka, 1992; Hirdes et al., 1994). The 
gold in the Birimian and Tarkwain systems was mined by the indigenous kingdoms; its 
trade was controlled by the Akan kingdom. The Akan kingdom was in the interior forest 
of the present-day Eastern, Western and Ashanti regions in Ghana; the kingdom produced 
most of the gold and traded it at the coast with the Europeans. Salt, pepper, kola nuts, 
gum, ostrich feathers, dye-woods, beads and expensive clothing could be exchanged for 
gold and slaves. The internal gold trade was also concentrated at the mouth of the river 
Benya in Elmina (Agbodeka, 1992), where salt and gold were exchanged. Elmina and 
other coastal communities produced salt from coastal lagoons through the natural process 
of evaporation. After evaporation through the sun, the crystal salt left on the sea bed was 
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gathered for sale or exchange. This natural process continues to today (see Agbodeka, 
1992; page 18, 19). 
         By 1480, the Portuguese dominated the West African gold trade; they bought most 
of the gold stock from the Akan Kingdom, which mined, stockpiled and controlled it. 
Making a clear statement that they intended to control the trade of gold and ivory and 
later slaves through force, the Portuguese built Elmina Fort in 1482 (Figure 3.4). This 
military installation allowed the military control of trade routes inland and protected them 
against any incursion from other European competitors—and there were many. The 
enormous gold resources at the coast and in the Elmina region led to the region being 
called ‘mina’ meaning ‘mine’ or a town of gold (Decorse, 1992, Freeman-Grenville, 
1991; Hilson, 2002).   
 
 
               Figure 3.4. Elmina Fort/castle built by the Portuguese in Ghana in 1492. 
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The continuous development of the gold trade fostered growing interest among 
Europeans; they viewed gold as a mercantile commodity to be bought cheaply in West 
Africa and sold for considerably more back home. The ensuing trade war encouraged the 
Portuguese and other Europeans, including the Dutch, Danes and British, to build castles 
and forts as barracks, warehouses and lodging places for gold trading and military control 
of the trade. On the western coast of Ghana, for example, forts were built at Axim, 
Shama, Ankobra, Princestown, Takoradi, Sekondi and Butre. These forts eventually 
became slave forts where slaves were gathered, traded and held for export during the era 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade from the 15th to 19th centuries. The forts also acted as 
supply depots for Asian, American and European materials, vegetables, and fruits 
introduced at the coast as part of what environmental historian Alfred Crosby called the 
‘Columbian exchange’ (Crosby, 1972).   
          The main aim of building these forts was not the colonial domination of the people 
of the littoral but the maximization of opportunities for profitable trading activities 
(Agbodeka, 1991). However, as the Europeans had an interest in keeping trade and 
commerce routes monopolized and on favorable terms, the Ghanaians became colonized, 
establishing unequal relationships of trade and eliminating self-rule (Freeman-Grenville, 
1991). The European navy, lighthouses, forts and other coastal installations helped to 
produce and secure the Gulf of Guinea as a commodity frontier in ways that continue to 
impact the present.  
The forts were initially established by the Portuguese and were later employed by 
the Dutch and the British after the Portuguese were forced out due to financial 
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mismanagement, colonial revolts and the unsuccessful exploration of new resource 
frontiers (Hilson, 2002). This paved the way for the Dutch in the gold trade, but their 
reign was short lived. They were profoundly challenged by the British militarily, 
illustrating Gavin Bridge’s (2009) assertion that gaining access and control of natural 
resources is always an issue of political contestation that involves and produces violent 
conflict. Despite the revolts and contestations, the gold trade remained dominant along 
the coast; it was firmly controlled by the British after the Portuguese left. The British 
built other forts at Komenda to gain access to the interior forest for gold resources and to 
enhance trading opportunities (Hargreaves et al., 1991).  
         By the 16th century, attention had turned from the gold to the slave trade. When the 
slave trade began at the West African coast, the Dutch and Portuguese empires preferred 
to continue their gold exploitation (Agbodeka, 1992; Rodney, 1969). During this period, 
the economy of most European states was based on gold that had been obtained through 
ongoing military conflict and colonization (Agbodeka, 1992; Utter, 1992). However, the 
slave trade became the main activity when the existing stock of gold at the coast ran out, 
and efforts by European empires to invade the interior forest and raid the Akans failed. 
The Europeans withdrew the favourable mercantile policies Ghana enjoyed that excluded 
them from the slave trade, replacing one commodity frontier with another (Agbodeka, 
1992; Hargrove, 2015). The demand for labor in silver mines and plantations in Spain, 
the need for sugar cane cutters in Portuguese colonies and Portuguese Brazil’s demand 
for millers in their extremely profitable sugar plantations propelled the slave trade and 
drove up the prices for slaves and the profits of their sale (Wolf, 1982). Slaves were 
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violently appropriated along the West African coast by the West African kingdoms and 
empires and transported to the western coast of Ghana, where they were sold to 
Europeans at the forts and castles (Akpan, 2013). 
        Before the escalation of the slave trade at the West African coast, the African 
economy had developed a feudal class structure, with many people in the low-class 
category. At the gold coast, many people were classified as porters and laborers, though 
slavery was never inherited. Slaves could become part of the elite group after long years 
of servitude (Agbodeka, 1992; 25). This structure of African slavery was quite different 
from the system deployed on plantations in the Americas, where captives and their 
offspring remained slaves forever—so called chattel slavery (Davidson, 1988; Decorse, 
1992). The slaves traded to the Europeans were people who had been used to settle debts, 
those punished for disobeying kings’ rules, and those captured in war (Rodney, 1969; 
Wolf, 1982).   
           Many people were captured and slave numbers dramatically increased along the 
coast of Ghana with the advent of firearms in the 16th century. The firearms led to the 
emergence of wars among many small states and kingdoms vying to control the slave 
trade; activities revolved around people known as ‘Big Men’27 (Wolf, 1982).  
                                                
27 In the 16th century, ‘Big Men’ were powerful entrepreneurs in the ancient kingdoms. They 
controlled trade with the European traders. According to Wolf (1982), some had fleets of war canoes 
and an army to facilitate their wealth accumulation. An example is the Akrosan brothers. The younger 
Akrosan brother controlled the Fetu kingdom after the death of the elder brother. He wanted to trade 
with the Dutch at Elmina. Other Big Men include the Akomani of the Akwamu kingdom, who 
controlled Christianborg Castle (see Wolf, 1982). Contemporary Big Men are powerful actors in the 
resource sector, particularly oil and gas. They include traditional heads, ministers in charge of energy, 
and leaders of oil companies. They desire to benefit from oil and gas exploitation. The documentary 
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The local states got firearms through the Europeans, who sold or distributed them to local 
traders. The Portuguese, in an attempt to protect their trading forts at Elmina, spread 
firearms to the indigenes along the coast. Similarly, the British traded knowledge of 
firearms with Akan traders in the 1660s. Inikori (1977) and Richards (1980) cited in Wolf 
(1982), demonstrate that over time the number of firearms significantly increased in the 
region from 180,000 in 1730 to between 283,000 and 394,000 between 1750 and 1807. 
The increased number of firearms at the coast promoted warfare among the Ghanaian 
kingdoms: Denkyira, Akyem, Adanse, Akwamu, Akan and the Asante all attempted to 
protect their territories and expand them. The firearms and increased violent warfare 
produced captives who were traded as slaves. The Ashanti, for example, had a well-
armed military that conquered kingdoms in military campaigns and traded captives as 
slaves with the Europeans at the coast (Wolf, 1982). In short, the arming of the Ghanaian 
kingdoms enabled resources, including slaves, to flow. Therefore, when considering 
commodity frontiers, we must also consider the need for violence to maintain resource 
flows. As Moore (2017a) argues, resources require violence to be produced and 
maintained; thus, conflicts are often associated with resources in the GOG.  
        By the mid-17th century, the slave trade exceeded the gold trade in economic value 
at the littoral. The Dutch West Indies Company took control of the trading ports in 
Elmina, Axim, and Shama along the Gold Coast in 1637. In 1665, the heavily militarized 
British Royal African Company conquered the Dutch at the coast and took control of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Big Men by Rachel Boynton examines corruption in Ghana and Nigeria (see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsjubN_4H3E; Klieman, K. (2016). Cultures of Energy 
Podcast.  Episode #70.   http://culturesofenergy.com/ep-70-kairn-klieman/  
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slave trade. The British Royal African Company had made Ghana the primary source of 
the Atlantic slave trade by the 18th century. Slaves came from all corners of the powerful 
Ghanaian kingdoms; Akwamu, Ashanti and Volta. They were traded for mirrors, knives, 
iron, beads, and expensive clothes brought from Europe (Agbodeka, 1992). 
        The slaves were shipped to Europe, the American mainland and the Caribbean to 
work on different commodity frontiers (Moore, 2017a). Early capitalism relied on cheap 
labor to enhance productivity, reducing the cost of production and increasing profits 
(Moore, 2017a). Slaves were appropriated as cheap nature28 and exported to the West 
Indies, Central America, North America and South America, particularly Brazil, by the 
mid-1500s (Klein, 2010; Thomas 1997). The slaves worked in mines and on rice, coffee 
or cotton plantations. In later stages, large numbers of slaves worked on sugar plantations 
(Moore, 2017a).  
      African slaves were in high demand; they were hardworking and resistant to disease. 
Once they were captured, they were marched to the slave forts on the coast and could not 
be rescued by their relatives (Wolf, 1982). On the ships, the captains cut off the ears of 
slaves as proof of their purchase. Some died of disease due to poor sanitation (Wolf, 
1982), and because of the number of readily available cheap slaves along the coast, 
captains threw the sick into the sea. Klein (2010) says many slaves who had not seen 
white men before saw them as carnivores. Many committed suicide or starved themselves 
to death, believing their souls would return home when they died. Women and children 
                                                
28	 According to Moore (2017a), cheap nature is appropriated by empires and put to work for free or at 
a low cost based on the law of value to increase productivity. 
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were kept above the deck; they were abused, harassed and raped. The men were kept 
below deck and made to dance or exercise to curb any rebellions until they reached their 
destination (Thomas, 1997).   
 
 
Figure 3.5; Map showing the destination of West African slaves in the 15th to 17th 
centuries. Source; Atlas of Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (Eltis and Richardson, 2010).  
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By the 18th century, up to 15 million Africans had been traded from the slave 
coast to Europe, North and South America (Eltis and Richardson, 2010), as shown in 
Figure 3.5. Slaves were exported through the forts and castles in Axim and Elmina 
constructed by the Portuguese, Dutch, British and the Danes along the coast. Agbodeka’s 
(1992) analysis shows that about 10,198 slaves aggregated from different parts of the 
western region and coastal Ghana were exported from Cape Coast castle alone in two and 
half years and about 5,000 slaves passed through Anomabo annually. When the slave 
trade was abolished in the 19th century, resource capitalism at the Gulf of Guinea entered 
a new stage with far reaching consequences for ocean space and other economic activities 
along the coast.  
                                Oil and Gas Development, Fisheries and Ocean Grabbing  
This section discusses developments in oil and gas and fisheries from the colonial 
period to the present and explains how oil and gas contributed to the appropriation of 
ocean space.  
Oil and Gas Development  
 By the end of the 19th century, resource exploration and exploitation at the coast 
focused on oil and gas extraction. The geology of Ghana was exploited again, this time 
for fossil fuels. The coast of Ghana has four sedimentary rock basins; the Western Basin 
(Tano-Cape Three basin), Central Basin (Saltpond), Eastern Basin (Accra-keta basin) and 
inland Volta Basin (Figure 3.6) that contain hydrocarbons (Boateng, 2008). The 
enormous sedimentary rock basin attracted new users, oil and gas explorers and industrial 
development. Most of the exploration activities at the coast in the 19th and 20th centuries 
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were unsuccessful and had minimal detrimental effects on fisheries. The oil and gas 
explorations of the early 21st century found large deposits, however, and this transformed 
the fishing coast. 
 
      Figure 3.6; Offshore sedimentary basin of coastal Ghana. Adapted from Peters  
        and Garrey (2014).   
 
 
 
          The British West African Oil and Fuel Company (WAOFCO) started oil 
exploration in 1896 but oil was only found through natural ‘seepages’ as described by the 
Ghana Petroleum Commission. During this period of exploration, there was no 
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sophisticated technology. The only means to identify the presence of oil was to see traces 
floating on the surface of water. Such observation was followed by the drilling of shallow 
wells to confirm the presence of oil. WAOFCO conducted five hydrocarbons drills 
between 1896 and 1903, but only one of the wells at a depth of 35 meters was successful 
and produced five barrels of petroleum per day (Boateng, 2008; Gatsi, 2017).  
       Societe Francaise de Petrole (SFP) arrived between 1909 and 1913. SFP drilled six 
wells, which produced seven barrels of oil per day at a shallow depth of 12-17 meters. 
However, between 1923 and 1925, the British owned company, Africa and Eastern Trade 
Corporation (AETC), drilled two wells at the coast and discovered both oil and a shallow 
depth of gas for the first time in the history of oil and gas exploration in Ghana (Boateng, 
2008; Gatsi, 2017). This enticed an American corporation, the Gulf Oil Company (GOC), 
to explore the coast in search of commercial oil and gas between 1956 and 1957, but their 
efforts proved futile.  
        In 1957, Ghana became the first of any colonized state in Africa to gain 
independence. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the country’s first president was a nationalist who 
wanted to do away with British domination and make Ghana economically independent. 
In his speech at the formal open opening ceremony of the Tema oil refinery in 1963, he 
stressed the need to make Ghana an independent and industrial capitalist state through 
resource development. This, he said, began with the establishment of the Tema oil 
refinery. He emphasized modernization and the importance of oil to the successful 
development of the nation: 
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Since the attainment of our political independence, there has been no doubt in our 
minds as to the direction in which our duty lay; namely to develop Ghana into a 
modern industrial state. It is only in this way that we can survive as an 
independent country. To achieve this, we have to rid ourselves of the economic 
patterns and institutions imperialism left behind by colonialism. Oil is the life 
blood of industry. It is as important for industry as water is for human existence. 
Without oil the wheels of industry refuse to turn that is why government has 
decided to buttress its program of industrialization by the establishment of an oil 
refinery in Ghana. (Nkrumah, 1963)29. 
 
 Nkrumah’s administration focused on the Volta and the Accra/Keta basins, searching for 
commercial oil and gas between 1960 and 1966. Based on a Ghana-Soviet Union 
collaboration, Nkrumah introduced Soviet and Romanian geoscientists from the 
Industrial Export Company of Romania to exploration activities, but they were 
unsuccessful (Boateng, 2008). The data gathered by the Soviet and Romanian 
geophysicists, however, marked a shift in oil exploration from onshore to offshore 
discoveries and drilling (Dickson, 2011).  
          In the 1970s, the search for commercial oil and gas continued offshore in the 
Saltpond field in 1970, but it was not until 1979 that an oil discovery was made in the 
field by the US-based company Agri-Petco (Ghana Petroleum Commission, 2007). A 
sub-commercial discovery of gas was made in the South-Tano Basin by another 
American oil firm, Philips Petroleum, in 1981, but there was no market for the gas, so the 
company abandoned the field (Boateng, 2008). The progress in the Saltpond field and 
other offshore explorations resulted in the creation of a national oil and gas regulatory 
body to expand offshore oil and gas exploration.   
                                                
29	http://nkrumahinfobank.org/article.php?id=439&c=51  
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           Provincial National Defense Council Law 64 (PNDCL 64) created the Ghana 
National Petroleum Company (GNPC) in 1983 as a regulatory body to oversee oil 
exploration and production processes. In addition, the introduction of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in 
1982 gave the governments of the Gulf of Guinea states control of the neighboring littoral 
out to 200-nautical miles (Dundas, 1994). The EEZ gave Ghana the rights, control and 
management responsibilities for natural resources, hydrocarbons and fish, at the littoral. 
With the region’s available resources and the power conferred on GNPC by PNDCL 64 
and UNCLOS, oil and gas development in the region intensified. However, GNPC’s 
attempts to commercialize oil and gas were unsuccessful. As part of its ongoing efforts, 
GNPC funded a 3D seismic dataset and acquired a 2D seismic dataset with the support of 
the governments of Japan and Canada. Petro-Canada International Assistance 
Corporation (PCIAC) intensified oil and gas exploration at the coast in the Tano-Cape 
Three Basin from 1984–1989 (Boateng, 2008; PCG, 2016). Wells were drilled and oil 
rigs and infrastructure were developed over the South Tano Field (Cape Three Point 
fields) by the GNPC in 1994, but little was achieved until exploration moved to the 
deeper water off the coast.  
        In the post-independence era, capitalist development through commercial oil and gas 
resource exploitation was aided by transnational corporations, not government run oil 
companies like Petro Canada. This period marked a neoliberal phase of capitalist 
development where transnational corporations invested heavily in oil and gas exploitation 
in the offshore basin of the coast. GNPC signed a contractual agreement with oil and gas 
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investors and companies to undertake exploration in the deep water Tano Basin/Cape 
Three Points using a 3D seismic dataset in 2003. The abstract representation of ocean 
space as an oil frontier depicts the ocean as divided into private property holdings and oil 
and gas blocks of exploration sites (shown in Figure 3.7) leased to a consortium of oil 
companies from the US and the UK - Kosmos Energy, Anadarko, E.O. Group, Hess 
Corporation and Tullow Energy (Whaney, 2010).  
After over 100 years of concerted efforts exploring for oil, the big find came in 
2007 when commercial quantities of oil and gas were discovered in the Tano Basin in the 
Jubilee oil field (Figure 3.7). The exploration continues to expand the occupation of 
significant sections of ocean space, with many other major discoveries made at sites such 
as Dzata, Ebony, Odum, Sankofa, Owo, and Teak 130 in the Deep Tano Basin following 
the Jubilee discovery. However, the post-independence exploration encroaches on ocean 
space and has alienated small-scale fisheries. Whenever the government grants licenses to 
oil firms to carry out the exploration and exploitation of oil in the ocean, the zone of 
appropriation and exploitation also extends and widens, harming those who gain 
livelihood from the sea in the form of fishing rather than drilling.  
 
 
 
                                                
30	Tweneboa, Dzata, Ebony, Odum, Owo, Mahogany 1 and Hyedua (seen on coastal maps in Figure 
12) are local names given to property sites or blocks where oil and gas are exploited. The names stem 
from the names of wood found in the forest; Sankofa is a popular Ghanaian adage that expresses ‘a 
revisit to the past for a forgotten culture/tradition’.			
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Figure 3.7; Private property map showing license oil companies, the Jubilee field and 
other discovered fields. Source; ghnanaweb.com (2010) 
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Commercialization of Fisheries and Ocean Grabbing 
 
        The Gulf of Guinea littoral has been an important food source of marine fish for a 
growing population that pre-dates European colonialism (Adjetey, 1973). Traditional 
fisheries with uniquely designed dugout canoes dominated the fishing sub-sector. The 
dugout canoes used traditional fishing gear: the cast net, ‘Ali’ net (gillnet) or floating and 
bottom nets to catch fish seasonally between July and October (Akyeampong 2007; 
Adjetey 1973; Nunoo et al., 2014). Common marine fish species were small pelagic 
species: round and flat sardinella, chub mackerel, herring, and anchovy. The colonial and 
post-colonial governments made conscious efforts to commercialize the fisheries 
resources to ensure Ghana and many West African states could create a modern, 
industrialized and commercial fishing industry (Akyeampong, 2007; Finegold et al., 
2010; Nunoo et al. 2014). However, the efforts for the commercialization of small-scale 
fisheries did not impact the activities of fisher folk, as they were geared towards creating 
self-reliance in food production and promoting the export of larger tuna species using 
large fishing vessels.        
          The high demand for fish ignited partnerships between the UK and the British 
West African colonial governments to invest in commercial fishing aided by the Colonial 
Development Fund as early as the 1950s (Akyeampong, 2007; 178). Fishing vessels of 
varying sizes were introduced, boatyards were constructed, and repair and maintenance 
facilities and refrigerating stores were established. Such investments ensured the 
continuous provision and maintenance of the protein content in Ghanaian diets. At the 
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same time, they aimed to avoid the import of canned and frozen fish and to develop a fish 
export trade to boost foreign exchange (Adjetey, 1973).  
             On an experimental basis, in 1948, the Gold Coast colonial government through 
its fisheries department introduced planked vessels with inboard motors to industrialize 
fishing (Nunoo et al., 2014; Odotei 2002). Two 30-foot vessels with inboard engines 
were imported from UK shipyards. The boats were functional but too expensive for the 
local fishers. Nonetheless, the success of the two boats led the fisheries department to set 
up a local boatyard corporation at Sekondi. Boats were built from wood and supplied to 
artisanal fisher folk, with the cost to be paid off in installments (Akyeampong, 2007). The 
boatyard industries produced about 163 vessels 27’-32’ long (for the inshore fishery); 
they were leased to fisher folk throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Akyeampong, 2007; 
Bennet et al., 2001; Nunoo et al., 2014).        
             In 1959, outboard motor vessels were introduced into the small-scale fisheries31 
sector, and this helped transform artisanal fishing productivity. These were dugout canoes 
with an outboard motor, allowing movement further offshore and bigger catches farther 
from the coast. But these boats were limited in their function because wind and other 
physical conditions offshore dictated dugout speeds and fishing pace (Akyeampong, 
2007; Bennet et al., 2001; Nunoo et al., 2014). Boats with massive gears (particularly the 
                                                
31The paper uses artisanal and small-scale fisheries interchangeably to reflect FAO definitions of 
small-scale or artisanal fisheries. Artisanal/small-scale fisheries describe traditional fisheries that 
involve households as opposed to commercial entities; they use relatively small amounts of capital 
and small fishing vessels (canoes in the case of artisanal types) and are intended for subsistence rather 
than commercialization. The prefix ‘artisanal’ or ‘subsistence’ is applied based on the level of 
technology at the local scale where it is practiced. See 
http://www.fao.org/faoterm/collection/fisheries/en/  
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‘Ali’, herring seine net popular among artisanal fishers) were unable to reach distant 
fishing locations because the gears were too heavy. Only those fishing with hook and line 
could access remote places over 20 miles from the shore (Akyeampong, 2007). In 1962, 
the Tema boatyard was established to enhance large-scale fish catches. Large, locally-
made wooden fishing vessels up to 70 feet long were built, with many performing the 
dual role of bottom trawling and purse seining (Anon, 2008; Bennet et al., 2001; 
Kwadjosse, 2009). 
          The industrialization program continued in 1962, when a national fisheries 
corporation was established to help the already heavily capitalized fisheries sector and 
transform it into a modern industrial sector using wage labor. The fisheries corporation 
oversaw the fishing fleets and their activities and operations in deep sea fishing. Their 
activities were complemented by the implementation of the 200-mile EEZ in June 1983 
(Dundas, 1994; FAO, 2008). This gave Ghana exclusive jurisdiction over the continental 
shelf and natural resources therein. The EEZ also gave the government the right to 
engage in a contractual agreement with foreign fishing fleets today known as fishing 
access agreements.  
        However, unlike other West African nations, the Ministry of Fisheries in Ghana 
does not have fish access agreements with any nation; rather, private fishing companies 
are contracted to extract, process and export fish (Antwi, 2016). The government wants to 
generate revenue by commodifying fish and to make large contributions to the country’s 
GDP by exporting high value fish species such as tuna. For example, the government 
contracted foreign companies such as Pioneering Food Processing Industry International 
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(Starkist) from America and the Ghana Agro Foods Company (GHAFCO) in Tema to 
harvest, process and export canned tuna found in Ghanaian waters but rarely caught by 
inshore fishers (Antwi, 2006; Finegold et al., 2010). The revenue generated was used to 
import less expensive fish to supplement the small pelagic catches of artisanal fisher folk 
to meet the growing demand for seafood in the country (Antwi, 2006). According to Atta-
Mills et al. (2004), quotas of high-value species are sometimes exchanged for research or 
economic assistance in fisheries sciences from the developed world and management 
assistance tied to bilateral relations between industrialized nations and Ghana. An 
example is the strong mutual relationship between China and many other states in Africa, 
including Ghana.  
In 2002, the state and fisheries department implemented an Inshore Exclusive 
Zone (IEZ) based on the Fisheries Law of 2002 Act 625 (Fisheries Policy of Ghana, 
2002; Kwadjosse, 2009). The IEZ denotes territorial waters of a depth of less than 30 m 
extending to 12 nautical miles. This was implemented to protect small scale inshore 
fisheries and ensure there is no trawling activities by inshore and industrial vessels. 
However, fish migrate and this has not stopped the steady decline of inshore fishery 
resources as the law intended (Attah- Mills et al, 2014). 
Decline and Enclosure of Fisheries as ‘Ocean Grabbing and Enclaving’ 
The rationale for ocean grabbing in Ghana is the need to enhance food production 
to feed the growing national and global population (Franco et al., 2014). In the colonial 
and post-colonial era, Ghana made an effort to sustain and improve food production but 
the inshore fish stock crashed in the 1990s. As I go on to show in this section, despite the 
	122	
decline in the fish stock, small-scale fishers were not excluded from the use of the ocean. 
This only happened when oil and gas commercialization began in the mid-2000s.  
The decline in the inshore fisheries has been attributed to the rate of commercial 
development of the fisheries. The transition from artisanal fishing to industrial fish 
exports with the introduction of larger vessels did not occur concurrently with other 
needed facilities such as cold storage and infrastructure for the cold distribution of fish32 
(Adjetey, 1973). Therefore, this can be framed as a development failure, with not enough 
modernization occurring quickly enough. The round, flat sardinella and chub mackerel 
were once common but declined due to high levels of exploitation through industrial 
purse seining by national fleets, as well as the use of inappropriate gears and small mesh 
sizes (Attah-Mills et al., 2004). Industrial fleets destroyed the small-scale fishing stocks 
following an absurd but repeating global pattern of overfishing by these fleets known as 
roving bandits (Atta Mills et al., 2004; Berkes et al, 2006; Nunoo et al., 2014). In the 
Ghanaian waters, many of these trawlers extracted fish very close to the shoreline, 
destroying the fishing gear and grounds of small-scale fishers. Fishers complained that 
trawlers damaged the sea floor, destroying the breeding grounds of fingerlings. The 
financial compensation offered by foreign fleets and trawlers in the name of foreign aid 
were not adequate to promote the growth and development of a Ghanaian industrial 
fishing industry (Alder and Sumaila, 2004). The scope of their activities was such that the 
                                                
32 Modern fish preservation through mechanical refrigeration or ice packed on the fish during and after 
harvesting at a temperature of below 00C keeps the freshness of the fish; this surpasses the culturally 
preferred practice of smoking preservation led by women, even though the smoking method has 
advantages. 
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Ministry of Fisheries and Fisheries Department made trawling in Ghanaian waters illegal 
in 2008, but only after major stock declines (Ministry of Fisheries, 2008).  
Local fishing communities saw little in terms of development because revenue 
from fish resource exports landed in the coffers of the central government without 
reaching coastal fishing communities (Alder and Sumaila, 2004). This created food 
insecurity and a loss of sovereignty. Fishers and indigenous communities lost culturally 
preferred fish species and the revenue generated from exporting fish. Their plight was 
complicated by the fact that high-value fishery resources must be exported to generate 
revenue for the importation of less expensive, but low-value frozen fish (chub mackerel, 
sardinella) mainly from Spain, Mauritania and Namibia, arguable less nutritious than the 
fresh and locally caught and prepared fishes.  
        The declining fish stock and the export of high value fish species affected the key 
role of fish workers and processors in the fish value chain. According to Fisheries Act 
625 (2004), 10 percent of tuna species extracted by Pioneering Food Processing 
International and the Agro-Food Company of Ghana are to be sold in Ghana; however, 
these contracted companies export to America and Europe rather than the local market 
(Antwi, 2006). These dynamics not only displace artisanal fishers but, more importantly, 
the exclude women from their central role in fish processing and selling. The women who 
process, distribute and sell the fish throughout the country have no role in the industrial 
fishery system. When the small-scale inshore fisheries fail, women are forced to migrate 
with their husbands or are excluded from the fishery (Adusah-Karikari, 2015). The only 
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profitable fishing businesses in Ghana at present are those importing fish for local 
consumption from European and other African nations (Attah-Mills et al., 2004).  
        Although the introduction of UNCLOS and the EEZ promised to serve a useful 
purpose in conserving living resources in Ghanaian waters, they limited the access of 
Ghanaian fishing fleets (Akyeampong, 2007; Nunoo et al., 2014; Odotei, 2002). Many 
Ghanaian fishing fleets that plied the waters of neighboring West African countries such 
as Senegal, Benin, Togo and Nigeria during the pre-colonial and early parts of the 
colonial era were banned from fishing in these newly nationalized waters in the 1960s 
(Akyeampong, 2007; Atta-Mills et, 2004; Odotei 2002). Fishing fleets in the waters of 
overseas nations were now considered a security risk (Acheampong, 2007; Odotei, 2002). 
The implementation of the EEZ limited Ghanaian fishing fleets’ access from 13 countries 
to six between 1976 and 1988, while the fleets in national waters were unable to compete 
with the international fishing vessels from Europe, North America, and Asia allowed into 
the Western Gulf of Guinea both legally and illegally.  
         While the decline in small-scale fisheries had long been a concern, 21st century oil 
and gas extraction (beginning in 2007) was the final blow to small-scale inshore fisheries.  
In the quest to enhance development through oil and gas exploitation, ocean space was 
appropriated from inshore fishing people. GNPC sold the right for oil and gas exploration 
and production in the ocean to companies from the United States, Canada and Europe; 
these companies finance the exploration and exploitation. The extension of financial 
capital into natural resource industries leads to the control of those resources, driving 
ocean grabbing and processes of enclave development with securitization that excludes 
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resources communities and alienates previous users of the resource space (Franco et al., 
2014; Ferguson, 2006). Oil and gas exploitation involves the installation of large and 
expensive capital equipment in sizeable portions of the ocean. The floating production 
and offloading storage (FPSO) MV21 Kwame Nkrumah33 is installed in deep offshore 
waters; it stores crude oil from the Jubilee field temporarily before it is offloaded to oil 
terminals at Tema and Takoradi. Gas pipe lines about 45 km long are laid to connect the 
deep-water pipes of the Jubilee field (Stephen in Pereira, 2015). The offshore gas from 
the Jubilee field is transferred to the gas processing plant at Atuabo, which generates and 
supplies liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and electricity to meet domestic market demands 
(Stephens, cited in Pereira, 2015). The West African gas pipe line project runs along the 
Gulf of Guinea coastal states as well from Nigeria. The FPSO, oil tankers, onshore Ghana 
pipelines, and West African gas pipe lines occupy parts of the ocean space formerly used 
by inshore fisheries (shown in Figure 3.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Kwame Nkrumah MV21 is the floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel used 
offshore in oil and gas exploitation. It is named after Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana. 
	126	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8; Ghana’s oil blocks and the West African gas pipeline originating  
from Nigeria.   Source; GNPC, 2011 
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          Oil and gas exploitation rules require that no activity be done within 500-m radius 
around the oil and gas rigs, pipelines and other infrastructure (Thuy and Arbo, 2015). 
This law is backed by the Ghana National Petroleum Act 1983 (PNDCL 64) which 
confers the right to ‘explore, produce and dispose’ of (Stephens, cited in Pereira, 2015) 
petroleum resources for the Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC) on behalf of 
the state. The regulatory activities back oil and gas exploration, relegating fishers and 
their activities to the periphery.  
Evidence suggests that the activities of small scale fishers in communities in the 
western region are enormously impacted by oil and gas. In small communities such as 
Cape Three Points and Akwidae, fishers claim oil and gas activities have reduced their 
fish catch levels, affecting their source of income (Agyei et al. 2012; 186). Adusah-
Karikari (2015) demonstrates that in Axim and Atuabo in the western region, the 
livelihood of female fish processors has been greatly impacted due to the low fish catch. 
Many of these fish processors have had to follow their husbands who migrate to nearby 
countries like Cote D’Ivoire to fish or engage in other economic activities. Fish species 
are obviously not the main focus of the oil and gas industries; however, the strong lights 
around the oil rigs draw fish to the rigs, thus closing off the ocean space around the oil 
rigs for fishers.  
Despite the impacts, the state continues to exercise its powers to benefit from the 
Gulf of Guinea frontier at the expense of marginalized fishers and fishing communities. 
The fishing places have been appropriated as private property sites for capital 
accumulation and are guarded by the navy through violent enforcement of the no-go zone 
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regulations (Gary, 2009). This denies the small-scale fisheries access to their livelihood 
and source of food, compounding the problems small-scale fishers already face because 
of industrial trawlers.  
The coastal communities in western Ghana, like many others along the West 
African coast are part of a high fish consumption zone—the highest per capita fish 
consumption in the world (Figure 3.9). But the small-scale forms of food production and 
consumption have been suppressed to enable oil commodification. Restricted areas 
around the oil and gas infrastructure have become a ‘de facto’ no-take, marine protected 
area (MPA). Consequently, the catches of artisanal fishers have been reduced (Agyei et. 
al., 2012; Adusah Karikari, 2015; Boohene and Peprah, 2010) and they are being 
excluded from newly emerging fishing grounds. Their plight is heightened by the fact 
that oil and gas jobs require skilled personnel, but many of the fishers and the community 
youth do not possess the requisite skills.  
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  Figure 3.9; Seafood consumption by coastal communities.   Adapted from Cisneros- 
Montrmayor et al., (2016) 
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The negative impacts of oil and gas exploitation have led to resistance and 
conflicts between small-scale fisheries and the oil and gas industries. In the western 
region, some fishers have defied the no-go zones to fish closer to the oil infrastructure, 
but there are clashes with the navy whenever they fish close to the oil rigs (Gary, 2009). 
Although such stories are officially denied, a Cape Militia has been formed by the youth 
of the coastal communities. The youth are protesting the effect of oil and gas on their 
livelihoods; they aim to fight against what they describe as injustice. Violence is bound to 
occur when there is alienation, enclosure and exclusion (Franco et al., 2014).  
However, these structural factors are not part of the resource curse explanation, as 
it focuses on the agency of government leaders and regulators. The resource curse theory 
postulates the conflict between fish and oil as a problem emanating from poor 
governance and mismanagement of resource rents. Such emphasis considers conflicts as 
problems that can easily be fixed, ignoring the crucial role of resource commodification 
and ongoing global resource grabs tied to enclave development by colonial and 
neocolonial actors, government and non-state actors operating in global resource 
capitalism.  
Conclusion 
The Gulf of Guinea littoral today is a geopolitical space known for oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation (Soares de Oliveira, 2009). These activities have generated 
conflicts because of the enclosure of part of the ocean space. The resource curse 
theoretical position attributes economic under-performance and conflicts associated with 
resource-endowed nations to the abundance or scarcity of resources and the agency of 
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political leaders. But researchers have criticized the resource curse thesis as reductionist 
and ahistorical, failing to take structural economic and historical contexts seriously 
(Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi 2009, 2010a). The resource curse theory ignores historical 
resource and commodity grabs by hegemonic colonial forces, empires and modern state 
and non-state actors who influence resource appropriation and perpetuate the 
establishment of commodity frontiers and the violence generated by them.  
Exploring the conflict through the lens of historical geography leads one to reject 
the simplistic assumption that the abundance of resources in resource-rich economies 
results in conflicts. Instead, it considers a diversity of actors, processes and discourses to 
create a holistic understanding of resource conflict. Using the ideas of resource grabs tied 
to enclave development, and commodity frontiers, the paper discusses ongoing 
commodity exploitation along the Ghanaian littoral since the 15th century. It argues that 
despite the diverse use of the coast in the long history of capitalism, only oil and gas 
exploitation have managed to appropriate and enclose fishing spaces central to the well-
being of coastal and inland Ghanaians. 
            The toponomy of maps of the region shows diverse resource geographies and 
commodities of the western Gulf of Guinea tied to colonialism. The names slave coast, 
gold coast, ivory coast and oil and gas coast appear together or in succession, each 
promoting appropriation and exploitation. During colonial periods of appropriation 
beginning in the 15th century, the coast and ocean space served as a trade site and a 
means of transportation for commodities to Europe and the Americas. Fishing activities 
and food production were not the focus, so the ocean space was not enclosed. As 
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Steinberg (2001) argues, the ocean space was simply a route to enhance trade during this 
period. However, the Gulf of Guinea has shifted from this Steinberg classification. The 
ocean is now understood as ‘land’ that can be divided into territories, enclosed and 
commodified. Although fishing commercialization and commodification led to the 
decline of inshore fisheries, small-scale fisheries survived until oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation began in the 19th century. Even then, the situation was not critical. Only 
in the new millennium has it become a matter of life and death for fishing communities 
and those who rely on them. Capitalist oil and gas commercialization since 2010 has 
exploited and appropriated fishing places and shut out small-scale fisheries. The 
exploitation and appropriation are aided by the Ghanaian navy who ensure oil and gas 
exploitation spaces in the ocean are not encroached upon. Fishers and other fish workers 
are deprived of their livelihoods and must depend on revenue generated from the oil and 
gas commodification or must migrate in search of paid work. Fish in the ocean and small-
scale fisheries activity have been replaced with oil and gas revenue that is highly 
centralized. In this age of capital and development, it is assumed that a fish consumption 
deficit due to oil and gas exploitation can be easily rectified through imports, using the 
higher revenue that would be generated from oil and gas exploitation. Fish workers are 
made to believe that the higher GDP and revenue contribution from the oil and gas 
development can provide for all the infrastructure and social amenities—but this is by no 
means certain. The plight of small-scale fisheries is ignored to ensure the continuous 
production of oil and gas, yet there is little contribution to the western region where the 
oil and gas are located, threatening the fishing sector, food security and sovereignty.   
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This paper has presented the conflict between fish and oil from the perspective of 
historic resource grabs tied to enclaves and commodity frontiers instead of adhering to 
the dominant narrative of the resource curse that focusses on poor governance in the 
present. The resource grab approach explains the conflict holistically by considering all 
factors and uses of the ocean space that might result in resistance and conflict. It 
identifies the key agents involved in colonial and post-colonial resource grabs and the 
degree of power and control they possess. Future study to solve resource grabs politically 
and through non-violent means could include historical political ecology analysis aimed 
at understanding resource access. Such an approach would expose all the processes of 
dispossession, and political marginality that influence resource access. This might 
involve studying property rights, forms of exclusion, and the legitimacy of key 
stakeholders in resource access.  
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    CHAPTER 4 
 
 Conclusion 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In the western region of Ghana, ocean space is now recognized as an oil and gas frontier, 
but the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas has created conflict between the oil 
and gas industry and small-scale fisheries in the use of ocean space. This thesis gives an 
account of the conflict in the use of ocean space, seeking to answer two important 
questions. First, how might the resource curse theory frame an understanding of the 
conflict between the oil and gas industry and the artisanal fisheries? Second, how has the 
historic Gulf of Guinea ocean space been mapped, represented and valued as a resource 
frontier from the time of European contact in the 15th century to the present, and how 
does this relate to the resource curse theory? These questions follow from the thesis’ two 
objectives: (1) to understand the complexity of the conflict between the oil and gas 
industry and small-scale fishing (SSF) activities; (2) to understand how the oil and gas 
industry and SSF value, represent and map ocean space and the implication for fisheries, 
food security, and sovereignty in the western region of Ghana.  
          Findings in the resource curse literature suggest that problems such as poverty and 
conflicts associated with resource exploitation and development in resource endowed 
states can be explained economically (Bougrine, 2008; Subramianai, 2013). Such 
analysis obscures the different ways conflict could be explained based on past resource 
uses, commodification and colonial contacts and interactions. The thesis suggests that the 
conflict in the region could be understood through a historical geography of resource 
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grabs tied to enclaves and commodity frontiers. The use of an historical geographical 
approach rejects the reductionist and simplistic explanation of conflict and focuses on 
broader historical factors, actors and processes of dispossession that underline resource 
conflict. Put otherwise, the thesis explores alternative ways of understanding the conflict 
between the oil and gas industries and small-scale fisheries. This concluding chapter 
recapitulates the key findings and explains the impact of the conflict on food security and 
sovereignty.  
4.1 Summary of the Chapters  
         Chapter 2 explored the resource curse literature to show how conflicts can be 
understood in the context of the abundance and scarcity of natural resources. The 
literature shows that an abundance of resources in resource-rich economies tends to 
enhance economic growth when proper management regimes and governance practices 
are enforced (see Bougrine, 2008; Robinson et al., 2006). However, resources have been 
the source of conflicts and underdevelopment in many resource-endowed nations in the 
sub-Saharan African region. In Nigeria, Angola, DR Congo, Chad, and Sierra Leone, the 
abundance of oil and gas and diamonds has led to resistance and violent conflicts. This 
stems from adverse conditions such as heightened poverty, lack of social amenities, 
histories of (neo)colonialism and the corrupt practices of officials in public and private 
organizations. Resource communities in Sierra Leone and the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria, for example, remain impoverished and marginalized; the livelihood of the people 
suffers amidst oil wealth (Ukiwo, 2008, Kabia, 2008).  
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         In the western region of Ghana, oil and gas production since 2010 has appropriated 
and enclosed fishing spaces. The ocean space has been commodified as oil and gas space 
to generate revenue for the nation at the expense of fish for food. There is abject poverty 
in coastal communities in Ghana, a higher rate of corruption, and mismanaged resource 
rents which can be situated within the resource curse literature of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, the oil and gas extraction requires people with expertise, leaving no job 
avenues for small scale fishers seeking alternative employment. Moore (2017b) says 
conflicts are inevitable when there are exclusions. Furthermore, there is ongoing resource 
appropriation in commodity frontiers; oil and gas commercialization in the ocean has 
resulted in conflicts with small scale fisheries. Resource conflicts and resistance like 
these are generally framed as inevitable in the resource curse literature on sub-Saharan 
Africa (Le Billion, 2001a, 2001b; Obi 2009; Obi 2010).  
The resource curse theory, however, has been increasingly criticized. Researchers 
contend it does not adequately explain conflicts, as it focuses on the agency of 
governance actors and not those actors excluded from resource access. The resource 
curse theory is considered reductionist, simplistic and ahistorical (Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi 
2009, 2010). Researchers contend that the theory focuses on internal economic factors, 
ignoring external geopolitical forces, the central role of (neo)colonial military forces, and 
the structural relations between resource endowed states and their colonial and 
neocolonial masters (Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi 2010). It also ignores the on-going global 
network of mineral rich enclave developments where resource rent is appropriated by 
hegemonic multi-national corporate actors in the global petroleum chain.  This enclave 
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development leaves resource adjacent communities impoverished and the resulting 
inequality helps to stoke resentment and violence (Obi, 2010). Scholars are paying more 
attention to violence and conflicts caused by global resource grabs tied to enclave 
development and appropriation by multinational corporate actors and their supporting 
institutions which alienate resource communities from adjacent resources (Furlong and 
Norman, 2015, Ferguson, 2006). 
        Chapter 3 establishes a connection between the hegemonic forces of colonialism and 
resource development in the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) to historically explain the conflicts. It 
employs three main theories, resource grabs tied to enclave development, commodity 
frontiers, and shifting toponymy, to offer alternatives to resource curse explanations of 
the conflict and illuminate the challenges posed for food security and sovereignty. The 
toponymy of maps of the GOG shows a shifting commodification along the coast, from 
gold, to ivory and slaves. Commodity frontiers are transformed and expanded by the 
appropriation of resources (goods, labor, and land) as Moore (2000) explains. The coastal 
resources have been grabbed, from the gold appropriated by Europeans to the present-day 
development of oil and gas.  
           The arrival of the Europeans in the 15th century marked the onset of capitalist 
exchange of gold and the slave trade at the coast. The forts and castles built by the 
Europeans enhanced the flow of resources and expanded commodity frontiers. Elmina 
and Axim castles, for example, served as warehouses to enhance trade. They stored the 
gold and slaves appropriated along the coast through colonial contacts with the 
indigenous Ghanaian empires. However, the slave and gold trade and contestation around 
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its control did not transform and appropriate ocean space from small-scale fisheries. The 
ocean was a means of transportation and a way to control trade. 
A much later commodification was the implementation of the EEZ and colonial 
fish commercialization efforts in the 1950s and 60s. The revenue raised was used to 
import cheap fish for local consumption; once again, however, the ocean was not 
transformed – small-scale fisheries were not enclosed or directly appropriated.  
Changes that threatened the livelihood of small-scale fishers in Ghana only came 
with recent oil and gas development. Beginning in the 19th century, resource development 
on the Ghanaian coast included exploration for oil and gas. But large oil quantities for 
commercial production were only discovered in 2007 by a consortium of oil companies 
led by Tullow Oil and Kosmos Energy. Since that time, GNPC oil and gas 
commercialization policies have created a block of sites licensed for transnational oil and 
gas companies. Oil and gas exploration activities in the Jubilee field and the associated 
physical infrastructure and no-go zones have transformed the behavior of fish (attracting 
them within no-go zones due to the mandatory use of lights on oil infrastructure) creating 
de facto marine protected areas and enclosing coastal fishing commons. The International 
Association for Standardization (ISO) requirements for oil and gas exploitation ban all 
activities within 500m of the oil rigs and infrastructure but the bright lights of the rigs 
have attracted the fish into the no-go zones. This has marginalized the fishing activities of 
the coastal fishers and reduced the fish catch (Adusah-Karikari, 2015; Boohene and 
Peprah, 2010). This impacts fish food security and sovereignty in a region with the 
highest per capita fish consumption in the world. 
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4.2 How does the conflict affect food security and sovereignty in the western region 
of Ghana? 
 
         In spite of the emphasis on the use of ocean space for oil and gas exploitation, fish 
remains very important in the diet of the average Ghanaian (Anon, 2008, FAO, 2016; 
Mensah et al., 2006). It is a source of food for 60 percent of the nation's population 
(Anon, 2008; Boohene and Peprah, 2010; Finegold et al., 2010; FAO, 2016). Among 
many sources of animal protein in Ghana, fish ranks as the cheapest and has the highest 
quality (Anon, 2008; Boahene and Peprah, 2010). The traditional ways fish are preserved 
prolong the shelf life, making it readily available to all for long term use even without 
refrigeration (Mensah et al., 2006). On average, per capita fish consumption in Ghana is 
estimated to vary between 20kg and 25kg per annum (Anon 2008; FAO, 2016; Mensah et 
al., 2006; MOFA, 2016), almost double the world’s average per capita fish consumption 
of 13kg per annum (FAO, 2016). Global estimates of fish food consumption by 
indigenous coastal communities (Figure 4.1) show the highest per capita consumption in 
the world in the Gulf of Guinea, with rates of over 165kg per annum (Cisneros-
Montemayor et al., 2016).  
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Figure 4.1; Global estimates of fish consumption by the coastal indigenous peoples. 
Adapted from Cisneros-Montemayor et al., (2016) 
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Despite the pressure on marine resources from foreign and industrial fishing fleets and 
non-renewable resource discoveries such as oil and gas, per capita fish consumption 
remains high in coastal communities and nations (see Cisneros-Montemayor et al., 2016). 
The Ghana Ministry of Fisheries has adopted intensive aquaculture development 
programs to increase fish food production to enhance coastal food security (Mensah et 
al., 2006, MOFA, 2010). There is an estimated consumption deficit of about 460,000 
metric tons (MOFA, 2010). The total annual fish required for the domestic market is 
880,000 tons, but annual production is around 420,000 tons. This ‘fish deficit' is made up 
by imports to supplement what is produced in the nation. The high value tuna species in 
Ghanaian waters are generally sacrificed to generate foreign exchange to import the low-
quality frozen fish like herring and sardinellas to make up the fish consumption deficit 
(Antwi, 2016). 
            With per capita fish consumption in Ghana further hit by the enclosure of ocean 
space, traditional/cultural food security and sovereignty are undermined and impacted. In 
what follows, I use the traditional Ghanaian fish sauce (shito) to illustrate the impact on 
food security and sovereignty in the country. Food security has been explained as the 
situation where people have economic, social and physical access to enough nutritious 
food for a healthy lifestyle (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). The analysis of food security has 
focused on availability of food at levels of scale ranging from the global to the national, 
community and household. The analysis often over-emphasizes the international and 
national scale and is based on countries achieving self-sufficiency in food crops and 
fisheries production based on market forces of demand and supply. But the FAO 
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understanding of food security calls for food access at all levels, from households to the 
national scale (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). This stresses the need to meet the nutritional 
needs of individuals through culturally, socially and religiously preferred foods, not just 
the availability of calories (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009).  
         Despite calls for an emphasis on culturally preferred nutritional needs to underscore 
food security, this has not been achieved when neoliberal globalization and international 
agencies determine food trade and policies (Lele, 2010, Wittman et al., 2010). Sowman 
and Carddoso (2010) argue that food security is determined by market narratives and 
intense competitive demands that consider the global scale. There is little emphasis on 
nutritious culturally accepted food for local communities, families, and individuals.  
Researchers now stress the need for the analysis of food security to include food 
sovereignty (Harcourt, 2008; Wittman et al., 2010). Food sovereignty refers to 
community food production and consumption of local and culturally nutritious, desired 
and acceptable food (Harcourt, 2008; Wittman et al., 2010, Windfuhr, 2005). This 
implies the eradication of food insecurity and poverty in food production communities 
and the avoidance of dumping surpluses from developing countries and corporations. It 
ensures indigenous people are the architects of their local communities; they control their 
natural resources, means of production and accessible markets and enjoy culturally 
acceptable foods; this alleviates poverty and hunger and allows people to live healthy 
lives (Wittman et al., 2010).  
The principles that underpin the concepts of food security and sovereignty explain 
some of the key problems in small-scale fisheries and issues of ‘no-take' and ‘no-go' 
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zones that undermine culturally acceptable and locally prepared foods from farmers and 
fisher folk in the western region. The ocean space is a source of traditional and locally 
preferred food but has been appropriated by commercial oil and gas to earn higher 
revenue for national development. Fishers and fishing communities are deprived of fresh 
fish and fish catch levels have declined (Adusah-karikari, 2015; Boohene and Peprah, 
2010).   
        The appropriation of the fishing commons through oil and gas capitalism has limited 
the security and sovereignty of food fish production and the traditional food shito (Figure 
4.2). This food is part of traditional Ghanaian cuisine developed by the Ga ethnic group 
and is eaten by all ethnic groups in the nation. Shito has cultural significance in Ghanaian 
society. The ‘sauce’ is prepared and served on such occasions as funeral ceremonies, and 
weddings. It also signifies a bond between a mother or father and a child who stays away 
from home on a periodic basis for schooling. The parents/mothers are unavailable to help 
the child’s food preparation so the sauce supports the child's meals. It serves as a quick 
means to have easily accessible meal at all times. The sauce lasts for months as the 
cooking process ensures all water is drawn out leaving the oil content as the preservative 
of the sauce. 
      Fish Sauce (Shito) is made with a combination of smoked dried grounded fish, 
composed of herring and shrimp. Preparing the sauce involves cooking the ‘grounded 
fish' in oil with blended onions, ginger, red hot chili (depending on the individual) and, in 
rare cases, tomatoes. The prepared sauce is bottled to be sold in commercial quantities or 
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served to family members. The fish sauce is served with fries, roasted meat, and 
traditional Ghanaian dishes like Kenkey, Waakye, and Yam.  
 
 
  
 Figure 4.2; Pictures of locally prepared fish sauce (Shito). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	154	
        Speaking personally, I recall the fish sauce made by my grandmother for my uncles 
and me during senior high school days. Knowing the relative importance of the fish sauce 
to a student, it was particularly surprising when my grandmother brought home a small 
quantity of fish from the market for Ghc60 (CAD $20) to prepare a sauce for my younger 
brother when the academic year began in August 2011.  I asked her why there were so 
few fish; she said, ‘The market is almost empty today,' meaning there were few market 
women and distributors (fish processors) in the market, hence the reduction in quantity 
but increase in the price of fish. That was strange because the academic year that begins 
in August coincides with the major fishing season. Fish from all fishing communities 
along the Gulf of Guinea coast flood markets across the country. I expected more because 
the supply of the fish generally exceeds demand during this season.  
        However, I now realize that the appropriation and enclosure of ocean space for oil 
and gas has influenced the availability of fish for subsistence food fisheries, including 
vernacular fish ‘sauce' customs. My grandmother, for example, has enormous experience 
with fish sauce. Though she is not from a fishing community, she has learned how to 
prepare fish sauce and many foods made from fish. She learned how to prepare fish sauce 
from her mother (my great grandmother) and perfected it through routine food 
preparation to have a unique taste loved by my family. Cooking foods, soups, stews, and 
sauces are part of her daily life. She has become so accustomed to cooking with fish that 
she cannot imagine herself without it. In a personal conversation with my grandmother in 
2016, I asked her whether she still eats fish. She said: ‘How can I stop cooking with and 
eating fish? Though I don't prepare shito as often as I used to do when you were all in 
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school but what will I eat if I don't take fish every day? Besides it is the best for my 
health at my age. There is fish in every food I prepare, but it is expensive these days.'  
Her statement underlines the impact the oil and gas commodification and 
enclosure of the ocean space have had on artisanal fishing activities and traditional food 
fisheries. This personal anecdote is consistent with the findings of researchers (Boohene 
and Peprah, 2010; Agyei et al., 2012; Adusah-karikari, 2015) on what is happening in 
western Ghana. Their findings show a reduction in the quantity of fish caught by fishers 
(Boohene and Peprah, 2010; Agyei et al., 2012; Adusah-karikari, 2015). Fish processors 
have limited fish for the markets and Ghanaians have less fish in their diets (Agyei et al., 
2012; Adusah-karikari, 2015) and many fish processors follow their husbands to nearby 
countries in search of fishery work (Adusah-Karikari, 2015). 
4.3 Significance of Study 
This thesis focused on a relatively small territory in the western region of Ghana. 
Nonetheless, its findings have important implications for both the resource curse theory 
and the resource grab theory. The resource curse theory is commonly used to explain 
resource conflicts (Obi 2009, 2010), but it is meeting with increased criticism 
(Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi 2009, 2010). At the same time, however, the use of the resource 
grab theory in explanations of conflict remains limited (Furlong and Norman, 2015). To 
fill the research gap, I assembled and analyzed maps and documents on resource grabs 
and appropriations in the Ghanaian portion of the Gulf of Guinea. My work illustrates the 
importance of situating the current conflict between oil and gas companies and local 
fishers back to previous conflicts that stretch back to the 15th century. It identifies various 
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resources that were exploited by colonial European empires and the conflicts this 
generated. 
    While previous studies use the resource grab theory to describe land appropriations and 
the extreme consequences to indigenous livelihoods (Borras et al, 2012), I explored the 
novel ways colonial and contemporary resource appropriation explain conflicts through 
diverse uses of the Gulf of Guinea. I used the resource grab theory to highlight ocean 
grabbing, thus adding to the existing literature on resource exploitation and uneven 
capitalist development. Finally, the thesis contributes to the ‘Too Big to Ignore (TBTI)’ 
research partnership on small-scale fisheries around the world by emphasizing their long 
history and contemporary importance.  
4.4 Ways Forward: Limitations and Future Study 
 
The main limitation of this study of the fish-oil conflict is the lack of detailed fieldwork 
data from on the ground observations in Ghana. I was unable to elicit the views of 
indigenous communities, fishers and the oil and gas industry. I have described the 
conflict by relying on government and non-governmental organization documents, 
archives, colonial maps, photographs, and reports. However, the government and non-
governmental agencies do not have proper documentation of the conflict between oil and 
fish. It is only documented and discussed in the popular media, such as the Internet news, 
websites, and some newspapers, none of which can be described as totally reliable or 
accurate sources.  However, I made sure to triangulate as much as possible from multiple 
sources to avoid reliance solely on the popular press.  
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        I found ways to work around the lack of field work by exploring how conflict is 
framed and looking for an alternative way to understand it. I began by framing the 
conflict as a resource curse, exploring the resource curse tendencies in the western 
region. I then proposed an alternative explanation using resource grab theory (Furlong 
and Norman, 2015). By framing the conflict as a problem of resource grabbing, I was 
able to trace the historical slave, gold and modern oil and gas appropriations along the 
coast as a way to contextualize contemporary resource conflict.  
          In light of the continuous expansion of the oil and gas activities in ocean spaces in 
the Ghanaian portion of the Gulf of Guinea, further research could explore marine 
management and conservation practices put in place by the Ministry of Fisheries and SSF 
reactions to them. This could include the possibility and consequences of the oil rigs and 
other oil and gas infrastructure serving as marine protected areas or fish conservation 
zones that may be opened up to periodic access by small-sale fishers.  
       Also, considering the critical role of the ocean in maintaining food security and 
sovereignty among the coastal population and in Ghana at large, increasing attention 
needs to be paid to the conflict, the Gulf of Guinea ocean ecosystem, and the political 
economy and ecology of its use and management. Conflicts have traditionally been 
framed as resulting from poor governance and the mismanagement of windfalls from 
natural resources. The conventional resource curse approach says resource abundance 
and its economic windfalls do not result in conflicts if there is good leadership (Robinson 
et al., 2016). But this approach has failed to lead to changes in policy or belief that 
alternatives to conflict are possible. Conflicts should be examined politically and 
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historically from the perspective of resource grabs to ground scholarship in empirical 
observation as opposed the abstractions and essentialisms embedded in resource curse 
theories. 
An in-depth exploration of historical commodity frontiers, the Gulf of Guinea 
ocean use and capitalist activities can be considered vital to understanding how capitalist 
activities can co-exist in the same space, including oil and gas activities and small-scale 
fisheries. Such an exploration would consider how Ghana can accumulate wealth through 
oil and gas commercialization and, at the same time, ensure continuous food production 
through fishing, and the limits to these assumed win-win approaches. The revenue 
generated by oil and gas exploitation cannot replace the fish and culturally preferred fish 
foods like sauce. Therefore, exploring marine spatial planning and opportunities and 
limitations to peaceful coexistence between fish and oil seems critical at a time when 
oceans are changing due to climate change brought on by centuries of colonial capitalist 
(under)development.  
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